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Overview 
Part one of this thesis reviews the literature on the interrogative suggestibility 
of individuals with intellectual disability.  The first section describes the historical 
background of interrogative suggestibility and the development of the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scales.  This is followed by a critical review of the methodology and 
findings of studies investigating the differences in suggestibility of people with and 
without ID and the implications for clinical practice. 
     Part two is an empirical study investigating the differences between adults 
with and without mild intellectual disability (mild ID) on an ecologically valid 
measure of fitness to plead and stand trial (FTP) based on realistic court proceedings.  
As expected, the adults with mild ID performed more poorly on all aspects of the 
FTP task matched to the five Pritchard criteria indicating that they found it 
significantly harder to understand various aspects of the trial process and 
proceedings.  There were also significant positive correlations between most of the 
measures of intellectual and memory functioning and performance on the FTP task.  
The limitations of the study, recommendations and clinical and legal implications of 
the findings are discussed. 
 Part three is a critical appraisal that focuses on two key issues related to the 
empirical study.  Firstly, the current method of assessing IQ and the diagnostic 
criteria of ID is discussed and particularly in relation to the nature of definitions of 
ID for research and clinical practice.  The review then considers the use of entirely 
novel measures in research with particular reference to the use of a novel measure of 
FTP as described in this paper. 
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Abstract 
Aim: This paper critically examines the current evidence base underpinning the claim 
that people with an intellectual disability are more suggestible than their average 
ability counterparts. 
Method: A systematic search strategy identified fourteen relevant empirical papers 
for review based on specified inclusion criteria.  These studies were critically 
evaluated in terms of their sample, design, methodology and findings, with particular 
reference to the applicability and validity of using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility 
Scales (GSSs) with people with intellectual disabilities.   
Results:  Early studies concluded that people with intellectual disabilities are more 
suggestible than their average ability counterparts.  However, more recent studies 
have shown that adapting the questioning style and asking about experienced events 
improves the amount and reliability of information reported by people with 
intellectual disabilities, sometimes to the level of their counterparts with no 
intellectual disability.  These findings are discussed in relation to criticisms of the 
validity of GSSs for assessing suggestibility in relation to experienced events. 
Conclusions: People should be assumed to be able to provide accurate and reliable 
information unless proven otherwise (Mental Capacity Act, 2005).  A high 
suggestibility score on the GSSs only highlights a potential vulnerability and should 
be interpreted with caution and in the context of clinical information and the 
circumstances of any given case.   
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Introduction 
Intellectual disability and the criminal justice system 
An individual with intellectual disabilities (ID) can come into contact with 
the criminal justice system as a victim-witness, a perpetrator witness, or another eye-
witness (Murphy & Mason, 1999).  At the police station perpetrator witnesses are 
suspects and at trial they are defendants.  The majority of research of individuals 
with ID has been confined to two main areas: as a witness or defendant in court; and 
their treatment in police custody, at police interview, and whilst giving testimony at 
trial.  When people with ID do come into contact with the criminal justice system, 
clinicians are increasingly being asked to report on the likely reliability of their 
evidence.  Suggestibility may affect the reliability of individuals when giving 
evidence at police interview and at trial and is therefore an important area for 
examination.  This review will focus on the interrogative suggestibility of defendants 
and eye witnesses.   
 
Suggestibility  
Suggestibility is regarded as a normal phenomenon involving a non-volitional 
response to a suggestion and the person believing it to be true.  Gheorghiu (1972) 
proposed that every time a stimulus is suggested three key aspects determine how it 
is received: the „content‟ (the message the suggestion has to offer), the „form‟ (the 
carrier of the message) and the „mode‟ (the manner in which the content of the 
suggestive stimulus is presented and transmitted).  The „suggestibility‟ of the 
individual refers to the tendency of the individual to respond in a particular way to 
suggestions.   
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Interrogative suggestibility 
„Interrogative suggestibility‟ was first raised as an issue in relation to the 
credibility of victim-witness evidence and to show that people with ID could be 
credible witnesses.  Although there is no one agreed definition, Gudjonsson and 
Clark (1986) describe suggestibility as: „The extent to which, within a closed social 
interaction, people come to accept messages communicated during formal 
questioning with the result that their subsequent behavioural response is affected‟ 
(p.84).  The interrogative process is generally accepted to be made up of five 
essential elements: a closed, typically highly stressful social interaction that has 
important consequences for those involved; a questioning procedure concerning past 
experiences and events; a suggestive stimulus (e.g. a leading question); uncertainty, 
which is determined in part by the cognitive capacity of the individual; acceptance 
that the stimulus is plausible; and a verbal or nonverbal behavioural response 
(Gudjonsson, 1997). Both theoretical and empirical work strongly suggest that 
interrogative suggestibility is a distinct type of suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1987).   
There are two main theoretical approaches to understanding interrogative 
suggestibility: the „experimental approach‟ (Schooler & Loftus, 1986, 1993) and the 
„individual differences approach‟.  Although very different, these approaches have 
complemented each other in furthering the theoretical understanding of interrogative 
suggestibility.   
The „experimental approach‟, illustrated by the work of Loftus and her 
colleagues (Loftus, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; Schooler & Loftus, 
1986, 1993), relied extensively on college students as experimental participants.  It 
aimed to understand the post-event conditions likely to affect eye-witnesses‟ 
evidence, such as questions containing misleading information, and the cognitive 
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processes involved in distorting reports of events.  In particular, this approach has 
highlighted how questions asked subsequent to an event, and particularly „leading‟ 
questions, have been found to cause a reconstruction in an individual‟s memory of 
that event (Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Schooler & Loftus, 1986). 
The „individual differences‟ approach, on the other hand, posits that 
suggestibility is mediated  by a number of different cognitive and personality factors 
and therefore considers the „experimental approach‟ to explaining suggestibility as 
too simplistic.  The „individual differences‟ approach is based on clinical research 
with varied and heterogeneous samples including normal participants, prisoners and 
psychiatric patients.  It is concerned with the disadvantages that certain 
characteristics (age, life experiences, cognitive factors, affective factors, substance 
misuse etc) can have on witnesses‟ accounts.  The most well-known work within this 
approach is the development of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; 
Gudjonsson, 1983, 1987) and a model of interrogative suggestibility (Gudjonsson & 
Clark, 1986) that distinguishes between an individual‟s response to misleading 
questions and their response to the negative feedback. 
Gudjonsson and Clark‟s (1986) theoretical model of interrogative 
suggestibility posits that the coping strategies people employ when faced with 
„uncertainty‟ and „expectations‟, in addition to the degree of their interpersonal trust 
in the interviewer, determine their suggestibility to „yield‟ to leading questions and 
„shift‟ from their original answer in response to „negative feedback‟.  „Yield‟ refers 
to the tendency of interviewees to give in to leading questions and closely reflects 
cognitive, particularly memory, processes.  „Shift‟ is more related the ability to cope 
with interrogative pressure, such as negative feedback and repeated questioning 
(Gudjonsson, 2003) and is more influenced by certain personality, interpersonal and 
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social characteristics and experience (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1992).  In this way, in order 
to confidently assert that there are differences in suggestibility between people not 
solely due to difficulty remembering the details of the event, one would therefore 
expect significant differences in both „Yield‟ and Shift. 
 
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales 
The outcome of a pioneering case study concerning a 22-year-old woman 
with ID (Gudjonsson & Gunn, 1982) resulted in the development of a standardised 
psychological test; the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; GSS1, Gudjonsson, 
1983; GSS2, Gudjonsson, 1987).  This behavioural test formally measures the two 
putative aspects of interrogative suggestibility in Gudjonsson and Clark‟s (1986) 
model.  The GSS2 is essentially a parallel version of GSS1 and was developed to 
enable the re-testing of a participant and to assess the measure‟s test-retest reliability.   
At present, the GSS is the most widely used method of establishing a 
person‟s interrogative suggestibility, i.e. the ability to provide reliable information 
within a legal context.  It was developed to address the need for an instrument to 
assess pre-trial criminal cases involving retracted confessions and to identify people 
who were particularly susceptible to erroneous testimony during questioning.  In 
particular, the GSS assesses an individual‟s tendency to be (mis)led by „leading 
questions‟ and the degree to which they change their initial responses following 
„negative feedback‟ (being told their answers are incorrect) when recalling an event.  
Strategies to minimise any tendency towards suggestibility during interview can then 
be identified, such as not repeatedly asking the same question or not providing post-
event misleading information, in order to elicit reliable testimony.   
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In both the GSS1 (Gudjonsson, 1983) and GSS2 (Gudjonsson, 1987), the true 
purpose of the test is disguised by introducing it as a memory test.  Both involve the 
participant listening to a narrative and then recalling all they can remember about the 
story to provide a measure of „immediate recall‟.  In the GSS1 the story concerns a 
woman having her handbag stolen whilst on holiday.  In the GSS2 the story describes 
a couple saving a boy from being hurt on his bicycle.  To increase the difficulty of 
the task, after a 50 minute time interval during which they are engaged in other 
activities, the participant can be asked to recall everything they can remember about 
the story again („delayed recall‟) after which the interrogation commences.  Neither 
immediate nor delayed memory is used in the scoring of suggestibility, but they 
provide useful information about the participant‟s recall of the interrogation context. 
After being read the story and recalling as much as they can remember the 
participant is asked 20 specific questions about the content of the narrative, of which 
15 questions are misleading.  The remaining five act as „filler‟ or „true‟ questions in 
which the correct answer is an affirmative one.  There are three general types of 
misleading questions in the GSS.  The first are subtle „leading questions‟ which, by 
including one or two salient premises, create certain expectations.  For example, the 
questions “Did the woman‟s glasses break in the struggle?” and “Did the woman‟s 
screams frighten the assailants?” include the premises struggle and screams and 
therefore make an affirmative answer plausible.  These subtly misleading questions 
were included because questions that embody a high degree of expectation were 
regarded as only being applicable to individuals who are highly suggestible 
(Gudjonsson, 1984a).  The second type of misleading questions are „affirmative 
questions‟ which tend to have a suggestive effect through an affirmative response 
bias (Sigelman, Budd, Spanhel & Schoenrock, 1981).  For example, the questions 
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“Were the assailants convicted six weeks after their arrest?” and “Did one of the 
assailants shout at the woman?” contain information that is not included in the story 
yet lead to affirmative responses.  The third type of misleading questions are „false 
alternative questions‟ which imply the presence of objects, persons and events that 
are not actually mentioned in the story.  Examples include “Did the woman hit one of 
the assailants with her fist or her handbag?” and “Did the woman have one or two 
children?” where in each case neither is correct so if an alternative answer is given 
then a suggestibility score is earned.   
The fifteen misleading questions are therefore designed to measure how 
much individuals give in, or „yield‟ to suggestive questions.  The „Yield 1‟ score is 
the number of times the person answers affirmatively or chooses a false alternative 
for the misleading questions.   
Negative feedback is then given in the following way to the interviewee 
regardless of their performance: „You have made a number of errors.  It is necessary 
to go through the questions once more and this time try to be more accurate‟.  The 
interviewee is then presented with the 20 questions again and scored as before to 
provide a „Yield 2‟ score.  The „Shift‟ score is the number of times the examinee 
substantially changes their answers following negative feedback.   
Both scales of the GSS have been extensively used in research and 
Gudjonsson (1992) has concluded that interrogative suggestibility can be reliably and 
validly measured by these scales.  The GSS1 has been shown to have satisfactory 
internal consistency (Gudjonsson, 1984a) and high test-retest reliability (Gudjonsson, 
1987).  Additionally, the finding that suggestibility was positively correlated with 
teachers‟ behavioural ratings of suggestibility among young boys with a criminal 
record (Gudjonsson & Singh, 1984) supports the criterion validity of the scale. 
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Richardson and Smith (1993) also analysed the degree of inter-rater agreement 
between two assessors using a sample of 57 young people between 10 and 17 years 
old with behavioural problems.  The correlations ranged from .95 for „Shift‟ and  .99 
for „Yield 2‟ (p=.001).  Similar correlations were found on the GSS2 (Clare, 
Gudjonsson, Rutter & Cross, 2004).  Correlations between scores on the GSS1 and 
GSS2 using the same participants („temporal consistency‟) were also all above .73. 
 
Intellectual disability and suggestibility 
Gudjonsson argues that research using the GSS highlights that people with ID 
tend to be more suggestible than those of average intelligence.  Gudjonsson and 
Clark (1986) suggested two reasons for this finding.  First, they argue that 
suggestibility is related to uncertainty, which itself depends to a certain extent on an 
individual‟s memory capacity which is also significantly correlated with intelligence.  
Secondly, suggestibility is considered to be influenced by the person‟s ability to cope 
with the uncertainty, expectations and pressure associated with interrogation.  It is 
therefore argued that individuals of lower intelligence may have more limited 
resources to cope with an unfamiliar task such as interrogation. 
However, more recent studies using adapted versions of the GSS or 
investigating the role of other factors such as style of questioning or interviewer 
behaviour have not found such unequivocal results (e.g. White & Willner, 2005). 
If people with ID are presumed to be unable to provide reliable evidence on 
the basis of their IQ they may be unfairly prevented from giving evidence which 
could have significant consequences for the trial in which they are involved.  It is 
therefore imperative that the issue of suggestibility among people with ID is better 
understood, bearing in mind the importance of „a fair and public hearing by an 
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independent and impartial tribunal‟ (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Council of Europe, 1950).   
 
Aims of this review 
This review builds on one by Beail (2002) and investigates the relationship 
between suggestibility and intellectual ability, and in particular the current evidence 
underpinning the claim that people with ID appear to be more suggestible than their 
average ability counterparts.   
 
Method 
Terminology 
In North America and the rest of the world except in the UK, „intellectual 
disability‟ (ID) is now the accepted terminology and is therefore used within this 
review.  The white paper Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001) defines an ID 
as: „a significantly reduced ability to understand new or complex information and to 
learn new skills (impaired intelligence); and a reduced ability to cope independently 
(impaired social functioning)‟ (P.14).  These difficulties must be present before 
adulthood and have had lasting effects on development.  This description emphasises 
that the presence of a low intelligence quotient, for example an IQ below 70, is not, 
of itself, sufficient for a diagnosis of ID; evidence of impaired intelligence and 
impaired social functioning must be present.   
 
Inclusion criteria 
Studies were deemed eligible for inclusion in this review if they met certain 
criteria.  Firstly, they had to be published by a peer-reviewed journal in the English 
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language between January 1990 and December 2010.  Unpublished material, case 
studies, book chapters and dissertations were not included.  Secondly, they had to use 
empirical methodologies, namely between-groups or correlational designs to 
investigate differences in interrogative suggestibility between people with and 
without ID.  Thirdly, participants had to be assessed with a measure of intellectual 
functioning and a measure of interrogative suggestibility.  Lastly, studies which 
included participants within the ID group who had an IQ up to 80 were deemed 
appropriate to include because the current cut-off of 70 is regarded as a fairly 
arbitrary figure by many clinicians and researchers.   
 
Search strategy 
An initial scoping search using the terms „interrogative suggestibility and 
intellectual disability‟ in Google Scholar produced 303 results, which included 
journal articles, books, book chapters and references, indicating this was a fairly 
highly researched topic. MetaLib was then used to identify the databases which 
generated the most relevant articles for this review using the search terms 
„interrogative suggestibility‟ AND „intelligence‟.  These databases were: FRANCIS, 
Embase, PubMed, PsychInfo, Web of Science and Scopus.  Each of these databases 
was then individually searched for study abstracts containing the terms „(learning 
disabilit* or intellectual disabilit* or mental* retard* or mental* handicap*) AND 
(interrogative suggestibility or suggestib*) using the Ovid database, which returned a 
total of 172 studies.   
The inclusion criteria described above reduced the number of articles 
identified as relevant for this review from 172 to 15 studies.  The references of these 
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15 articles were then searched and led to the addition of two articles.  In total, 17 
peer-reviewed journal articles were included in this review.   
 
Results 
Studies using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales in its standard format 
Nine studies were identified that used the GSS1 or GSS2 in its standard 
format and concluded that people with ID are more likely to yield to leading 
questions than their average ability counterparts (Table 1).   
In the first of these, Gudjonsson (1983) assessed 45 participants (26 males 
and 19 females) with the GSS1 to assess interrogative suggestibility, a short version 
of the WAIS-R, as a measure of IQ, and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) to investigate the relationship between personality 
traits, IQ and suggestibility.  Only results pertaining to the relationship between 
cognitive variables and suggestibility will be discussed here.  Pearson correlations 
revealed significant negative correlations between FSIQ and „Yield‟ (p=.01) and 
„Shift‟ (p=.001) scores and between both immediate and delayed memory and 
„Yield‟ and „Shift‟ scores on the GSS1.  Gudjonsson (1983) concluded from these 
results that participants of lower intelligence and with poorer memory recall were 
more suggestible.   
However, a number of issues question the reliability of drawing such 
conclusions.  Although the correlations were most marked when a total suggestibility 
score was used, „Yield‟ and „Shift‟ have been posited to relate to different processes, 
namely memory process for the former and personality characteristics and 
experience for the latter, and therefore are best considered separately.  Also, FSIQ 
scores and memory (both immediate and delayed) together accounted for 43% of the  
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Table 1 
   
Description of studies using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale in its standard format 
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Gudjonsson 
(1983) 
Non-clinical, UK sample.  N=45 (26 males, 19 
females).  Age range: 30.3 years to 33.4 years. All 
worked in different professions, from skilled to 
unskilled.   
Correlational design 
investigating relationship 
between intelligence, 
personality factors and 
suggestibility. 
WAIS-R: Pro-rated Verbal IQ from 
comprehension, similarities and vocabulary 
subtests; Pro-rated Performance IQ from block 
design and object assembly subtests. 
   EPQ 
   GSS1: Yield, Shift, Total Suggestibility, 
Immediate and Delayed memory scores. 
Gudjonsson 
(1990) 
UK sample.  N=60 (55 males, 5 females).  Age 
range: 16-62, mean = 31 years.  All were forensic 
participants referred by solicitors to author for 
assessment for court reports. 
Correlational design 
investigating relationship 
between intelligence, 
suggestibility, compliance and 
acquiescence 
WAIS-R: All 6 verbal and 5 non-verbal subtests 
 GSS1: Yield, Shift and Total Suggestibility 
 GCQ 
  Test of Acquiescence 
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); EPQ = Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975); GSS1 
= Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS-2 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GCQ = Gudjonsson 
Compliance Questionnaire (Gudjonsson, 1989); Test of Acquiescence (Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982). 
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Table 1 continued 
  Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Clare & 
Gudjonsson 
(1993) 
UK sample.  Group 1: Participants with mild ID 
(FSIQ 57-75, mean=65, SD 5.3) who attended 
special day centres for people with ID and/or lived 
in staff-supported residential placements. N=20 (15 
males, 5 females); 20-48 years (mean = 27; SD 
7.3).                   
Between groups (2) design 
comparing suggestibility, 
confabulation, acquiescence 
and intelligence. 
GSS2: Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility, 
Immediate and Delayed memory 
 Confabulation (distorted or fabricated elements in 
immediate and delayed recall of GSS story) 
 Group 2: Participants with average intelligence 
(FSIQ 83-111, mean = 99; SD 9.4), majority of 
whom were staff from mental health facility.  N = 
20 (11 males, 9 females); 18-50 years (mean = 30, 
SD 9.4). 
 Test of Acquiescence 
  WAIS-R: Full-scale IQ pro-rated from vocabulary, 
similarities, comprehension, picture completion, 
picture arrangement, block design and object 
assembly subtests. 
Gudjonsson & 
Clare (1995) 
UK sample, N=145 (92 males, 53 females).  Males: 
17-69 years (mean=32; SD 11.3); Females: 21-55 
years (mean=31; SD 7.9). Participants drawn from 
3 sources: i.) 66 attended day centres or residential 
services for people with ID; ii.) 58 were 
unemployed with no ID; iii.) 21 were employed as 
staff in the mental health service. 
Correlational and between 
groups (3) design comparing 
suggestibility, confabulation, 
acquiescence and intelligence. 
GSS2: Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility, 
Immediate and Delayed memory 
 Confabulation (distorted or fabricated elements in 
immediate and delayed recall of GSS story) 
 Test of Acquiescence 
  WAIS-R: Full-scale IQ.  N=122 completed entire 
battery; N=23 completed just 8 subtests due to 
practical constraints. 
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS-2 
= Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GCQ = Gudjonsson Compliance Questionnaire (Gudjonsson, 1989); Test of Acquiescence 
(Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982). 
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Table 1 continued 
  Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Henry & 
Gudjonsson 
(1999) 
Group 1-Children with ID: N=28 (12 girls, 16 
boys); 11-12 years old (Mean=11.92; SD=6.6 
mths);Mean  FSIQ=59.8 (SD=11.3, range=40-78); 
Mean mental age = 7.0years. 12 children came 
from special needs programs within mainstreem 
school, 16 from special SEN school. 
Between participants design 
with 3 groups of children 
separated according to mental 
age. 
Eyewitness task: free recall; general questions; open-
ended specific questions; Closed yes/no questions 
 WISC-III: 4 subtests (Similarities, Vocabulary, Block 
Design and Picture Completion) 
  
 
Group 2-Chronological age comparison children 
without ID: N = 19 (9 girls, 10 boys); 11-12 years 
old (Mean=11.58, SD=3.6); Mean FSIQ=100.5 
(SD=13.11, range 81-132); Mean mental age=11.42 
years.  All children came from same mainstream 
school as the 12 children in Group 1. 
 GSS2: Immediate recall, Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total 
Suggestibility NB No delayed recall & no 50 min 
delay before asked questions in line with manual 
recommendations for assessing people with ID 
  
  
   
 
Group 3-Mental age comparison children-N=21 (8 
girls, 13 boys) from 2 state primary schools; Mean 
FSIQ=100.2, SD=14.47, range=80-140); Mean 
mental and chronological age=7.25 years. 
  
   
   
Gudjonsson, 
Murphy & Clare 
(2000) 
UK sample of 49 residents with ID: 31 males, 18 
females; Age range: 24-70 (mean 37 years, SD 
12.6).  All were residents at homes for people with 
ID who were under investigation as potential 
witnesses in court case. 
Correlational design 
investigating relationship 
between intelligence, 
suggestibility, acquiescence 
and understanding of the 
meaning of 'truth', 'lie' and the 
meaning of the oath in court. 
WAIS-R: All 11 subtests providing scores of Verbal 
IQ, Performance IQ and FSIQ 
GSS2: Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift & Total Suggestibility 
 Test of acquiescence using 6 pairs of logically 
opposite statements requiring true/false response 
  
Understanding of the meaning of 'truth', 'lie' and 'the 
oath in court' 
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS-2 = 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GCQ = Gudjonsson Compliance Questionnaire (Gudjonsson, 1989); Test of Acquiescence 
(Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982); WISC-III = Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (Wechsler, 1991). 
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Table 1 continued     
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Gudjonsson & 
Henry (2003) 
UK sample of N=110 children (66 boys, 44 girls; 11-12 
years old) and N=221 adults (178 males, 43 females; mean 
age 30.6yrs, SD 11.7). Adult sample selected from 
Gudjonsson's files of defendants, witnesses & alleged 
victims to match FSIQ scores of child sample.  Both 
children and adults divided into 3 groups: i.) FSIQ 54 or 
below ('moderate' ID); ii.) FSIQ 55-75 ('mild' ID); iii.) 
FSIQ above 75 ('no ID'). 
Between groups (3) 
matched participants 
design. 
Adult participants: GSS2 (Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, 
Total Suggestibility, Immediate & Delayed recall); 
WAIS-R (FSIQ) 
  Child participants: GSS2 (Yield 1 only, Shift, Total 
Suggestibility, Immediate recall only); BAS-II short 
form or WISC-III. 
Henry & 
Gudjonsson 
(2003) 
Group 1:N=30(5 girls,25 boys) 11-12 yr olds with mild 
ID; IQ 55-79 (mean=65.6); 22 at SEN school  
Between-participants 
design with 5 groups of 
children. 
Eyewitness task and interview: free recall; general 
questions; open-ended specific questions; Closed 
yes/no questions 
 Group 2: N=17 (5 girls,12 boys) 11-12 year olds with 
moderate ID; IQ 40-54 (mean=45.5); N=16 attended SEN 
school 
Repeated eyewitness interview 2 weeks after 
eyewitness task: free recall; general questions; open-
ended specific questions; closed yes/no questions.  
 Group 3: N=25 (15 girls,10 boys) 11-12 yr olds of 
comparable chronological age without ID; 23 from 1 inner 
city mainstream school, 2 from another; mean IQ 
score=104.5. 
GSS2: Immediate recall, Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total 
Suggestibility NB No delayed recall & no 50 min 
delay before asked questions in line with manual 
recommendations for assessing people with ID 
 
 
  Group 4: N=14 (9 girls, 5 boys) 5-8 year olds of 
comparable mental age to Group 1; mean IQ 106.3;all in 
ordinary classes in same inner city primary school. 
TOMAL  
 BAS-II 
 Group 5: N=14 (6 girls, 8 boys) 5-8 year olds of 
comparable mental age to Group 2; mean IQ 100.6;all in 
ordinary classes in same inner city primary school.  
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS2 = 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GCQ = Gudjonsson Compliance Questionnaire (Gudjonsson, 1989); Test of Acquiescence 
(Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982); BAS-II = British Ability Scales-Second Edition (Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996); WISC-III = Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children - Third Edition (Wechsler, 1991); TOMAL = Test of Memory and Learning (Reynolds & Bigler, 1994). 
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Table 1 continued 
  
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Henry & 
Gudjonsson 
(2004) 
Group 1: N=22, 10-13 year old children with mild 
ID who attended a special secondary school for 
children with ID in South London or in mainstream 
school but with SEN program; IQ range 55-70 
2 factor between-subjects 
design consisting of the 
factors of group (3) and 
memory trace strength (2). 
BAS-II (Verbal Reasoning and Nonverbal 
Reasoning scales and Speed of Information 
Processing subtest) 
 TOMAL (3 subtests of Verbal Memory Index only 
for mild and moderate ID groups only) 
 Group 2: N=26, 10-13 year old children with 
moderate ID who attended a special secondary 
school for children with ID in South London or in 
mainstream school but with SEN program; IQ 
range 40-54 
Eyewitness memory  task and interview: free 
recall; general questions; open-ended specific 
questions; Closed yes/no questions (1/2 of each of 
the 3 groups viewed the same video clip twice - 
stronger trace strength condition-2nd 1/2 viewed it 
just once - weaker trace strength condition) 
  
  
 Group 3: N=37, 10-13 year old children of the 
same chronological age as Groups 1&2 but without 
ID in 2 mainstream schools in South London; IQ 
scores > 80. 
 
  
  GSS2: Immediate recall, Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, 
Total Suggestibility NB No delayed recall & no 50 
min delay before asked questions in line with 
manual recommendations for assessing people 
with ID 
   
   
    
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS2 
= Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GCQ = Gudjonsson Compliance Questionnaire (Gudjonsson, 1989); Test of Acquiescence 
(Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982); BAS-II = British Ability Scales-Second Edition (Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996); WISC-III = Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children - Third Edition (Wechsler, 1991); TOMAL = Test of Memory and Learning (Reynolds & Bigler, 1994). 
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variance in total suggestibility.  Therefore, 57% of the variance remained 
unexplained.   
Additionally, although Gudjonsson (1983) acknowledged that the participants 
were drawn from a variety of occupations (professional, skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled), actual data on the IQ ranges of participants was not provided, and the 
participants were aged between just 30 and 33 years old.  Therefore the ability to 
make confident conclusions about the wider general population is questionable.  
Secondly, only five subtests of the WAIS-R (comprehension, similarities and 
vocabulary for the Verbal scale, and block design and object assembly for the 
Performance scale) were used to calculate pro-rated FSIQ, which questions the 
degree to which the scores accurately reflected the participants‟ actual abilities.   
In a later study, Gudjonsson (1990) examined the relationship between 
intellectual abilities and suggestibility, acquiescence and compliance among a UK 
sample of 60 forensic participants (55 males and five females; 16-62 years old).  
Only results pertaining to the relationship between intellectual functioning and 
suggestibility will be discussed here.  All participants had been referred to the author 
by solicitors for court reports.  They were assessed with all six verbal and five 
nonverbal subtests of the WAIS-R and the GSS1.  The results showed a significant 
negative correlation between suggestibility and intellectual functioning.  When each 
subtest of the WAIS-R was considered in turn, the Picture Arrangement subtest was 
most strongly correlated with suggestibility.   Gudjonsson concluded that the latter 
finding implied a link between suggestibility and capacity for logical and sequential 
thought, and social awareness and sophistication.  In this way, people who can 
quickly size up a social situation are more able to detect discrepancies between what 
they observed and what is suggested to them (Gudjonsson, 1990). 
  
25 
When considering Gudjonsson‟s (1990) findings, it is interesting to note that 
the IQ ranges of the participants were not reported.  Additionally, only the „total 
suggestibility‟ score, attained by combining the „Yield‟ and „Shift‟ scores, was used 
as a measure of suggestibility.  Therefore, the degree to which „Yield‟ and „Shift‟ 
individually correlated with intellectual functioning is not known.  Lastly, a forensic 
sample was used which will have raised concern about effort, and an almost all male 
sample at that, which questions the ability to generalise the results to the wider 
population. 
A later study by Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) provided much more adequate 
data on the tendency to yield to leading questions and change responses following 
negative feedback among people with mild ID.  This between-groups study 
compared the suggestibility (as measured by the GSS2) of 20 participants of average 
intellectual ability (pro-rated FSIQ between 83 and 111 as measured by eight 
subtests of the WAIS-R) with 20 participants with mild ID (pro-rated FSIQ between 
57 and 75).   Although the participants with mild intellectual ability were 
significantly more susceptible to „leading questions‟ (Yields 1 and 2 of the GSS2) 
there was no difference between the two groups in terms of their responses to 
„negative feedback‟ (as measured by „Shift‟ score on the GSS2).   
However, with small sample sizes and a wide range of scores attained by both 
groups on all measures, only tentative conclusions can be drawn.  It has been raised 
that the lack of difference in „Shift‟ score may reflect ceiling effects on the GSS2 
where people who are very suggestible have less scope for changing their answers in 
response to feedback (Gudjonsson, 1990).  Alternatively, it may be that people with 
intellectual disabilities who attend day services experience stigma and their low self-
esteem may preclude negative feedback having any effect (Clare & Gudjonsson, 
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1993).  Lastly, it is not known how many of the ID group had an IQ above 70.  If 
there were many, this may have skewed the results of this group and be less 
representative of people with ID. 
Gudjonsson and Clare (1995) then went on to conduct a subsequent study 
using a large sample of 145 participants drawn from three sources: 66 attended day 
centres or residential services for people with ID; 58 were unemployed with no ID; 
and 21 were employed as staff in a mental health unit.  Participants‟ tendency to 
yield to leading questions and shift their answers following negative feedback was 
assessed with the GSS2 and their IQ with the complete WAIS-R battery (except for 
23 participants who only completed eight subtests due to „practical constraints‟).  
The mean suggestibility score was „considerably‟ higher than those found in either 
general or forensic populations (Gudjonsson, 1987, 1990; Gudjonsson, Clare, Rutter 
& Pearse, 1993), which led the authors to suggest that many of the participants were 
intellectually disadvantaged.  However, it is difficult to confirm or refute this 
conclusion as only the mean and standard deviation for FSIQ were provided, and the 
mean is very skewed by scores at the ceiling and floor. 
Pearson correlations revealed a significant negative relationship between 
„Yield 1‟ and „Yield 2‟ and intellectual ability, significant positive correlations 
between IQ and memory, but no significant relationship between IQ and „Shift‟ 
score.  These results were consistent with previous research.   
This study addressed a major criticism of previous studies by recruiting a 
much larger sample, but only the mean and standard deviation of the FSIQ of the 
sample as a whole was provided.  Therefore it is not known how many participants 
had FSIQs within the ID range, low average or average range.  Additionally, 23 of 
the 145 participants could not be assessed with the complete WAIS-R battery so it is 
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not known whether these participants had IQ scores across the range or particularly 
low or high IQ scores.   
Henry and Gudjonsson (1999) later compared 11-12 year old children with 
ID (N=28) with peers without ID matched for chronological age (CA; N=19) and 
mental age (MA; N=21) in terms of their ability to recall a live staged event and the 
degree to which they yielded to leading and non-leading questions of different 
formats.  All participants witnessed a live scene devised by the authors in which an 
actor and actress pretended to be visiting schools in the area to talk about what it was 
like to be at school 100 years ago.  During their talk a number of different things 
happened in relation to the three objects she presented: white chalk, a pink cloth, and 
a small chalkboard.  The scene lasted approximately four minutes and all clothing 
and props were standard for each enactment, and the entire scene was scripted. 
The following day a different investigator, unknown to the children, 
interviewed each child about the event the previous day.  The children freely recalled 
all that they could remember and were then asked questions in different formats, 
based as closely as possible on the recommendations in the Memorandum of Good 
Practice on Video Recorded Interviews with Child Witnesses for Criminal 
Proceedings (Home Office, 1992).  These formats were: general questions, open-
ended specific questions (half non-leading and half misleading), and 12 leading 
closed yes/no questions (half correct-leading and half misleading).  In this way, the 
authors were attempting to assess the suggestibility of the children about an 
experienced event.  All the children‟s IQ was assessed with the WISC-III (Wechsler, 
1992) and the GSS 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987) to investigate the relationship between IQ 
and suggestibility.  As recommended in the manual for persons with ID, the 
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questions of the GSS 2 were administered directly after the free recall test rather than 
after a delay of 50 minutes, therefore there was no measure of delayed recall. 
A moderate correlation was found between performance on the real-life 
eyewitness test and the GSS 2.  On the eyewitness task the children with ID 
performed at the level of the CA-comparable group for free recall, general questions, 
open-ended questions, and correctly-leading questions.  The children with ID were, 
however, more suggestible in response to closed misleading questions than were the 
children in the CA-comparable group, although they were not more suggestible than 
those in the MA-comparable group.  The authors suggest that social factors, such as a 
greater eagerness to please the interviewer, reduced confidence in their own memory 
of the event and a reluctance to disagree with an adult, may account for the increase 
in suggestibility for closed misleading questions in children with ID.  
On the GSS 2, the children with ID freely recalled approximately half as 
much information, and had significantly higher „Yield‟ but not „Shift‟ scores than the 
CA-comparable children.  Following an additional ANOVA for „Yield‟, „Shift‟ and 
„Total Suggestibility‟ using initial free recall as a covariate no significant group 
effect remained.  This suggests that the initial group differences for „Yield‟ reflected 
the fact that the children with ID were less able to initially recall the story.  
Gudjonsson, Murphy and Clare (2000) later conducted a study to investigate 
the capacity of people with intellectual disabilities to be witnesses in court in relation 
to the degree to which they yielded to leading questions and changed their answers 
following negative feedback.  Participants were 49 residents recruited through 
convenience sampling who were witnesses in an investigation of abuse by staff at a 
residential home for people with ID.  Participants were assessed with 11 subtests of 
the WAIS-R and the GSS2.  Only „Yield 2‟ of the GSS2 was found to be 
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significantly negatively correlated with FSIQ and immediate and delayed recall.  
This was therefore the first study to not find a significant relationship between „Yield 
1‟ and FSIQ.  This may reflect range effects (Gudjonsson, 1988) where intellectual 
ability and memory are distinct from suggestibility at the extreme ends of the 
distribution curve.  Similarly, studies using college students have generally failed to 
find a correlation between suggestibility and intelligence (Gudjonsson, 1987). 
It is important to note that 12 (24%) of the participants could not be 
psychometrically tested due to severe verbal communication problems.  Additionally, 
three of the remaining 37 participants could only be assessed with either the Verbal 
IQ or Performance IQ scale due to severe physical, sensory or communication 
disabilities.   The authors note that with six participants their scores were inflated by 
a floor effect since they did not actually pass any items, so the average IQ (53.8) of 
the group was likely to be artificially high.  Interestingly, although the authors noted 
that an IQ score below 70 is generally used to indicate ID, they still included 
participants with IQ scores up to 82, as evidenced by the IQ range provided (45-82).  
Therefore, a number of participants in the study may not have met current criteria for 
an ID (Department of Health, 2001). 
In an attempt to show that any difference in suggestibility between adults and 
children with and without an ID is only partially accounted for by poor memory for 
the GSS narrative, Gudjonsson and Henry (2003) recruited a sample of 221 adults 
whose IQ was assessed with the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981) and tendency to yield 
and shift with the GSS2 (Gudjonsson, 1987), and 110 children who were assessed 
with either the short form of the British Ability Scale-2
nd
 edition (BAS-II; Elliott, 
Smith & McCullouch, 1996) or the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991), and the GSS2.  The 
adult participants were selected according to full-scale IQ scores to match those of 
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the children‟s scores.  Both adult and child participants were split into three groups 
based on their FSIQ scores: „normal‟ (IQ above 75); „mild ID‟ (IQ 55-75); and 
„moderate ID‟ (IQ <55).   
For the child sample, the authors found highly significant differences between 
the three groups on all measures of the GSS2.  For the adult sample, highly 
significant differences were found on all measures except „Shift‟ where there was no 
significant difference between IQ groups.  The authors then conducted a further 
univariate analysis of variance on each of the four suggestibility scores using 
immediate recall as a covariate in the ANOVA.  For the child sample this reduced 
the significance of the group differences, but „Shift‟ and „Total Suggestibility‟ still 
remained significant.  For the adult sample, „Yield 1‟, „Yield 2‟, and „Total 
Suggestibility‟ scores were still significant.   Therefore immediate recall appeared to 
have less of an effect on „Yield‟ scores in the adult sample.  Additionally, immediate 
recall did not have any significant moderating effects on „Shift‟ in either sample.  
 These findings support Gudjonsson‟s (2003) view that the „Shift‟ type of 
suggestibility is less influenced by memory processes than the „Yield‟ type.  
Furthermore, the finding that „Shift‟ was not significantly elevated among the adults 
with ID supports the findings of Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) and Gudjonsson and 
Clare (1995), although it appears to contradict the findings of Everington and Fulero 
(1999), the latter study of which is discussed later in this review. 
Before drawing conclusions from this study, certain issues should be 
highlighted.  The adult participants had been previously referred to the first author 
for a forensic assessment of their IQ and suggestibility for the purposes of a police 
investigation or a court report.  Therefore some of this group, particularly the 
defendants, may have applied a questionable degree of effort during the tests.  
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However, Gudjonsson (2003) argued that when the proper instructions are followed, 
as provided in the user manual, suggestibility on the GSS has been shown to be 
highly resistant to faking. 
Also, whilst the adult sample were assessed with all parts of the GSS2, for the 
child sample only Immediate Recall, „Yield 1‟, „Shift‟ and Total Suggestibility were 
scored.  Additionally, a different examiner tested the children and adults which may 
have led to subtle differences between the groups in the interviewers‟ administrative 
and scoring styles.  Additionally, even though memory scores on the GSS2 were 
consistently low for the adults with intellectual disabilities, the suggestibility scores 
had a much greater range, highlighting important individual differences in 
suggestibility even among the moderately intellectually disabled group.   
A similar study by Henry and Gudjonsson (2003) utilised the same 
eyewitness task and interview as the study described earlier (Henry & Gudjonsson, 
1999).  However, this time they were investigating the effects of a repeated interview 
about the eyewitness event using the same questions after a short delay of two weeks 
on the amount of correct information recalled by, and tendency to yield to leading 
questions among, 11-12 year old child participants with and without ID.  There were 
five groups of children: a group with mild ID; a group with moderate ID; a group 
without ID but of comparable CA; a group of comparable MA to the group with mild 
ID; a group of comparable MA to the group with moderate ID.  All participants were 
also assessed with the GSS2 (Gudjonsson, 1987), four of the six BAS-II subtests 
(Elliott, 1996) and six subtests from the TOMAL (Reynolds & Bigler, 1994).  As in 
Henry and Gudjonsson‟s (1999) study and as is recommended in the manual for 
persons with ID, the questions of the GSS 2 were administered directly after the free 
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recall test rather than after a delay of 50 minutes, therefore there was no measure of 
delayed recall. 
For the GSS 2, the ID and comparative MA groups had similar mean 
immediate recall scores, whereas the CA group recalled more than twice as much 
information as the other two groups.  The ID and MA groups also had similar „Yield 
1‟ scores, which were significantly higher than those found for the CA group.  The 
children with moderate ID yielded to leading questions significantly more than the 
children with mild ID who in turn had significantly higher „Yield‟ scores than the 
children in the CA group.  When initial recall was used as a covariate this group 
difference in „Yield‟ disappeared, in line with findings from earlier studies (E.g. 
Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999).  The finding that the children with ID were still were 
more susceptible to shifting their answers after negative feedback when mental age 
was controlled for suggests that „Shift‟ in children with ID may be more mediated by 
social than cognitive (memory and intelligence) factors.  This last finding is 
interesting because studies with adults with ID generally show them to score 
particularly high on „Yield 1‟ and tend only to have a modest „Shift‟ score (Clare & 
Gudjonsson, 1993; Gudjonsson, Murphy & Clare, 2000).   
In terms of performance on the eyewitness task, children with mild ID were 
no more suggestible, as assessed by both „Yield‟ and „Shift‟, than children in the CA 
group.  This is a different finding to previous studies using mixed mild/moderate ID 
samples which have found children with ID to be more suggestible than age-matched 
peers (Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999).  This finding is particularly noteworthy given 
sensitive statistical tests were used to identify differences between the groups and the 
ability level of the CA comparison group was slightly above average.  This finding 
also counters the often negative expectations about the memory performance of 
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children with mild ID.  However, their tendency to change their answers to specific 
questions more frequently in the repeated recall session than children in the CA 
group implies that children with mild ID may suffer more through the repeated 
interviews that are characteristic of the legal process.  Additionally, although the 
eyewitness event was similar to a real event in terms of the cognitive skills required 
to recall it, it cannot be assumed that children with mild ID would perform as well in 
a more stressful crime-related interview. 
The children with moderate ID, however, recalled significantly less 
information and yielded significantly more to closed leading questions and they 
changed their responses in the repeated interview more frequently than their CA 
counterparts.  Interestingly, unlike the children with mild ID, when recall was 
controlled, the children with moderate ID were still more likely to „Yield‟ to leading 
questions than the CA group.  Therefore for the tendency to „Yield‟ in the moderate 
ID group cannot be fully explained by cognitive factors.  Social factors such as 
eagerness to please, reduced confidence in their own memory of the event and 
reluctance to disagree with an adult could provide alternative explanations for this 
finding.  Positively, whilst the information freely recalled by the children with 
moderate ID was sparse, it was actually very accurate. 
There are a small number of limitations of this study that may have affected 
the performance of the children.  Firstly, the questions in the eyewitness task were 
not randomly mixed in terms of the correct-leading and misleading yes/no questions.  
Therefore, potential order effects may have arisen and some children may have 
become suspicious or formed expectations about particular question types.  
Additionally, responses to correctly leading questions may have consolidated 
memory and made resisting the misleading questions easier.  Conversely, some 
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children may have assumed that the interviewer knew about the event, finding the 
misleading questions harder to resist.   
A year later, Henry and Gudjonsson (2004) compared 10-13 year old children 
with mild and moderate ID with typically developing peers of the same 
chronological age (CA) in terms of their responses to leading and non-leading 
questions about an eyewitness memory task.  The aim of the study was to explore 
potential mechanisms that might account for the ID-CA differences in the tendency 
to yield to leading questions found in previous studies (E.g. Gudjonsson & Henry, 
2003; Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003). It has been proposed that memory trace is more 
limited and has a shorter duration in individuals with ID resulting in poorer short-
term memory (Ellis, 1963).  Henry and Gudjonsson (2004) therefore examined this 
claim by investigating whether increasing memory trace strength would benefit 
children with ID more than those without ID.   
In each of the three groups of children (22 children with mild ID, 26 children 
with moderate ID, and 37 typically developing children of the same CA), half of the 
participants viewed a 3 minute video clip of a minor crime twice (stronger trace 
strength condition) and half of the participants viewed the same clip once (weaker 
trace strength condition).  There were no other significant differences between 
participants in the stronger and weaker trace strength conditions with respect to CA, 
MA, IQ or verbal memory.  
After viewing the video clip, each child completed the Speed of Information 
Processing subtest from the BAS-II appropriate to his or her ability level as a buffer 
task. For those in the stronger trace strength condition, the video clip was viewed a 
second time.  The interview followed and included the child telling the investigator 
all they could remember about the video clip (free recall), followed by the child 
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being asked a range of questions about the material in the video.  These included: 
two general questions, 20 open-ended specific questions, of which half were non-
leading and half were misleading, and 20 closed yes/no questions where the response 
was suggested by the wording of the question (half were correctly leading and half 
were misleading).  Therefore only the children‟s tendencies to „yield‟ to leading 
questions was examined, not the degree to which they change their answers in 
response to negative feedback („Shift‟). 
All children were also assessed with the Verbal Reasoning and Nonverbal 
Reasoning scales from the BAS-II (Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996) and the GSS 2 
(Gudjonsson, 1987).  The children with mild and moderate ID were also assessed 
with three subtests from the TOMAL Verbal Memory Index (Reynolds & Bigler, 
1994).  The scores from the BAS-II and TOMAL were used to establish approximate 
IQ scores for the children. 
Separate two-way ANOVAS incorporating two between-subjects factors of 
group (CA, mild ID or moderate ID) and trace strength (1 or 2) were used to examine 
performance on each eyewitness question only.  Increased memory trace strength 
improved the recall and reduced the tendency of all participants to yield to the 
misleading questions.  However, no interactions between group and trace strength 
were found in any of the analyses on each question type; the weaker memory traces 
of those with ID did not improve more after increases in memory trace strength than 
those of the CA controls.  Therefore the results did not support Ellis‟ (1963) 
hypothesis or the notion that a different memory storage mechanism is implicated in 
memory processes for children with ID versus CA controls.  
The groups were also compared in terms of their performance on each of the 
question types.  Similar to as has been found in previous studies, for the open-ended 
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recall there was a significant effect of group such that the CA children produced the 
most information, followed by the mild ID group and then the moderate ID group.  
The CA group recalled significantly more information in response to the general 
questions than did the children with moderate ID, but not significantly more than the 
mild ID group.  Interestingly, the children with moderate ID made significantly 
fewer errors on the free recall and general questions tasks combined than the mild ID 
and CA groups, although this may be because they recalled less information.   
For the open-ended misleading questions there was no effect of trace strength 
or group on performance, consistent with previous findings (Henry & Gudjonsson, 
1999, 2003).  However, for the open-ended non-leading questions, there was a 
significant effect of both memory trace strength and group.  Children in the CA 
group answered more questions correctly than children with mild or moderate ID.  
The performance of the two ID groups did not significantly differ.  There was a 
significant effect of trace strength and group for the closed (yes/no) misleading 
questions such that the CA group were less suggestible  than the children with mild 
ID who were in turn less suggestible than the children with moderate ID.  However, 
whilst there was a significant effect of memory trace strength on the closed correctly-
leading questions, there was no significant effect of group.  
Whilst the study lacked an MA control group to enable further evidence of 
the effects of memory trace on recall, and the application of the findings to the real 
world is somewhat limited due to the use of an immediate recall procedure and a 
video presentation, patterns of performance among the three groups were similar to 
those found in a previous study using a live staged event (Henry & Gudjonsson, 
2003).  Group differences between those with and without ID were fairly marked for 
general questions, open-ended non-leading questions and closed misleading 
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questions but were absent for open-ended misleading questions, correctly leading 
questions, and overall accuracy of open-ended recall. 
To conclude this section, the findings from the studies described indicate that 
whilst adults and children with mild and moderate ID can often produce accurate 
accounts of witnessed events in free recall and in response to general questions, 
children adults with ID, particularly moderate ID, are more vulnerable to agreeing 
with misleading questions.  Therefore, some cautionary measures, for example, 
allowing children and adults with ID to give unaided free recall first, using extreme 
care when interpreting responses to leading questions, and avoiding the repetition of 
questions may be appropriate when questioning children and adults with ID. 
   However, given the variability in the tendency to „Yield‟ or „Shift‟ the results 
also suggest that it would be unreliable to simply estimate suggestibility on the basis 
of memory and IQ scores, as even people with moderate intellectual disabilities have 
been shown to not necessarily be more susceptible to changing their answers 
following negative feedback than people without ID.  The large number of individual 
differences highlights that people with ID are not a homogenous group.   
Given the criticism that performance on the GSS is determined to a 
significant degree by memory for the event, a number of the studies in this section 
controlled for recall of the event in their statistical analyses.  In all but one case this 
removed any significant differences in the increased tendency to „Yield‟ to leading 
questions between children and adults with and without ID.  This finding supports 
Gudjonsson and Clark‟s (1986) theoretical model that „Yield‟ more closely reflects 
cognitive, particularly memory, processes whereas „Shift‟ is more related the ability 
to cope with interrogative pressure, such as negative feedback and repeated 
questioning (Gudjonsson, 2003) and is more influenced by certain personality, 
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interpersonal and social characteristics and experience.  This issue will be discussed 
throughout the remainder of this review. 
 
Studies changing the presentation of the GSS material 
Table 2 describes the seven studies identified that investigated the impact of 
changing the presentation of the GSS material on the suggestibility of people with 
and without ID.  
Tully and Cahill (1984) modified the GSS to include a real scenario to 
provide preliminary data on the „total suggestibility‟ (as measured by the GSS) of 
people with ID.  Their between-groups study comparing two „mentally handicapped 
groups‟ (FSIQ 50-66 and 67-90) with average ability counterparts (FSIQ >90) found, 
as the authors expected, that participants with a lower IQ remembered less and were 
more suggestible.  However, as only total suggestibility scores were provided it is not 
known whether the high scores reflected a greater tendency to „yield‟, „shift‟, or 
both.  Secondly, the criteria set for the IQ for each group seems rather arbitrary and 
in fact four out of 14 participants in the FSIQ 67-90 group had FSIQ scores within 
the average or low average range and therefore being placed within one of the 
„mentally handicapped‟ groups is questionable as the suggestibility scores of this 
group may not accurately reflect those of people with an ID.  Lastly, since Tully and 
Cahill‟s study the GSS has been replicated and improved to form the GSS2.  The 
GSS2 has higher internal consistency on both the „Yield‟ and „Shift‟ scales and its 
narrative passage and questions are easier to understand (Gudjonsson, 1993), and 
would have therefore potentially been more appropriate for people with intellectual 
disabilities. 
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Table 2 
   
Description of individual studies changing the presentation of the material in the GSS (E.g. simplified text, different formats, video-recorded etc.) 
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Tully & Cahill 
(1984) 
Three groups of adults.  Group 1: All had FSIQ 
between 50 and 66; Group 2: All had FSIQ 
between 67 and 90; Group 3: All had FSIQ above 
90.  Participants in Groups 1 and 2 attended special 
day facilities for people with ID.   
Correlational design 
investigating relationship 
between intelligence and 
suggestibility.  Also, between-
groups design comparing 
suggestibility of three groups 
of participants with and 
without ID.  
GSS1: Total Suggestibility, Immediate and Delayed memory 
scores. 
 WAIS-R: Full-scale IQ only. 
Cardone & Dent 
(1996) 
UK sample of N=60 adults (32 males, 28 females) 
with ID (FSIQ 53-74; mean = 59.93; SD 5.94).   
Age range: 24-56 years (mean = 36.8; SD=9.11) 
Between groups (6) design 
comparing recall of 
information and suggestibility.  
Participants received either 
verbal or verbal-visual 
presentation of information 
and one of three methods of 
eliciting recall (free recall, 
specific questions, general 
questions) 
GSS2: Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility, Immediate 
& Delayed memory 
 
Modified GSS2 to include 17 visual slides: Yield 1, Yield 2, 
Shift, Total Suggestibility, Immediate & Delayed memory. 
 
WAIS-R: 8 subtests (Information, vocabulary, similarities, 
comprehension, picture completion, picture arrangement, 
block design and object assembly) 
 
 General questions questionnaire 
 
  Specific questions questionnaire 
Everington & 
Fulero (1999) 
USA sample of 18 defendants with ID compared 
with 30 defendants without ID 
Between-groups design 
comparing recall and 
suggestiblity of participants 
with and without ID. 
GSS1: Modified to include a narrative passage simplified to a 
second grade reading ability and abbreviated to have just 12 
leading questions and 8 non-leading questions 
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS2 = 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987) 
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Table 2 continued 
  
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Milne, Clare & 
Bull (2002) 
UK sample of N=85 participants, most of whom 
were of White, British background.  Two groups. 
Group 1: Participants (N=47) with ID (34 males, 13 
females); age range = 19-59 years (mean: 35 
years); all recruited from day services in London & 
Portsmouth.  Group 2: Comparison group of 
participants (N=38) without ID (13 males, 25 
females); age range: 19-62 years (mean = 39 
years); all recruited through local job centre and 
through newspaper advertisemtn in Cambridge.  
Many were employed and/or with academic 
qualifications. 
Between groups (2) design 
comparing suggestibility and 
recall of participants with and 
without ID on an adapted 
version of the GSS2 
GSS1/2: Adapted version using video recording of a scene.  4 
questions were 'leading', 4 were 'false alternatives' and the 
remaining 4 were non-leading questions relating to correct 
information.  Like in the GSS1/2 participants were then given 
negative feedback and asked the same questions again. The 
same instructions were used as in the GSS1/2 
  Correct information 
  Incorrect information 
  Confabulated information 
Henry & 
Gudjonsson 
(2007) 
Group 1: N=16 12 year old children with ID who 
attended special schools for children with ID in 
England; matched for nonverbal IQ with Group 2. 
2 factor between-subjects 
design consisting of the 
factors of group (ID children 
vs typically-developing 
children) and age (8/9 years, 
12 years). 
BAS-II (pattern construction subtest): for younger typically-
developing children&children with ID only 
BPVS-II: for the younger typically-developing children and 
children with ID only 
 Group 2: N=18 8/9 year old children with ID who 
attended special schools for children with ID in 
England; matched for nonverbal IQ with Group 1. 
BAS-II (verbal reasoning and nonverbal reasoning subtests): 
for older, typically-developing children only (because subtests 
don't cover mental age<5yrs) 
 
  
 Group 3: N=20 typically-developing 12 year old 
children who attended mainstream schools in 
England 
 
BAS-II (speed of information processing subtest): for all 
children 
 Group 4: N=20 typically-developing 8/9 year old 
children who attended mainstream schools in 
England 
 Eyewitness memory  task and interview: free recall; general 
questions; open-ended specific questions; Closed yes/no 
questions 
    
 
 Modified version of GSS 2: only first 80% of story, first 80% 
of questions (16/20) and words simplified.       
Note: WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981); GSS1 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 1 (Gudjonsson, 1983); GSS2 = 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); BAS-II = British Ability Scales-Second Edition (Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996); BPVS-II = British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale - Second Edition (Dunn et al. (1997). 
  
41 
Table 2 continued 
  
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
White & Wilner 
(2005) 
Experimental group: N=20 (10 males, 10 females) 
adults with ID (FSIQ<70).  All at Centre 'E' 
Single factor between groups 
non-experimental design 
GSS 2: Free recall, Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total 
Suggestibility NB with modified language in negative 
feedback 
 
Control group: N=20 (10 males, 10 females) adults 
with ID (FSIQ<70). All at Centre 'C'.  
Alternative Suggestibility Scale (ASS) 
  
Alternative Suggestibility Scale-2nd version (ASS2) 
   
WASI 
   
BPVS 
Wilner (2008) UK sample (N=24) of participants with ID (FSIQ < 
70) attending day services in local area 
2 factor between-subjects 
design consisting of group 
(Experimental vs control) and 
presentation of material 
(divided presentation or 
multiple presentation 
Modified GSS 2 (called 'GSS R'): Free recall, recognition 
memory, Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility NB with 
modified language in negative feedback 
 
 
  
  
Alternative Suggestibility Scale -3rd version (ASS3) 
  
WASI 
      BPVS 
Note: GSS2 = Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - Form 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987); GSS R = modified version of GSS2 to include 10 forced-choice questions providing a score 
out of 20 for recognition memory; ASS = Alternative Suggestibility Scale to GSS2 and based on real event that took place at day centre 'E' 18 months before the study; 
ASS2 = Alternative Suggestibility Scale to GSS2 and based on real event that took place at day centre 'E'  1 month before the study; ASS3 = Alternative Suggestibility 
Scale to GSS2 and based on real event that took place at day centre 'E' 1 month before the study; WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999); 
BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn et al., 1982). 
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In a study investigating the impact of memory on performance on the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, Cardone and Dent (1996) presented the GSS2 
story in either a verbal format or verbal and visual format to a sample of participants 
with intellectual disabilities to assess the impact on their responses to leading 
questions and negative feedback.  Participants provided with both verbal and visual 
details of the story, which included 17 slides transforming the GSS2 narrative into 
pictures, had improved immediate and delayed recall and lower „Yield‟ scores.  The 
„Shift‟ scores were unaffected.  Unfortunately, as the visual presentation in this study 
merely comprised 17 slides highlighting key points in the verbal story it could be 
regarded as having limited ecological validity. 
 The study also investigated the impact of questioning style on the 
amount and accuracy of recall and suggestibility of participants with ID. Participants 
asked to provide details of the event in response to specific questions provided more 
complete and accurate information than with free recall or in response to general 
questions.  Although participants yielded and shifted their responses less to leading 
questions when they had recalled information from the story in response to specific 
questions, the differences were not significant.  However as the study only included 
participants with ID it is difficult to generalise the findings to the wider population 
and the amount and accuracy of information recalled by participants with ID could 
not be compared to a control group of participants without ID.     
 In spite of the improved recall and „Yield‟ scores participants‟ suggestibility 
scores were still higher than for people of average ability (Cardone & Dent, 1996) 
although the suggestibility scores or statistical comparisons with the available norms 
for the GSS2 were not reported.  However, the results still led the authors to 
conclude that the GSS1 and GSS2 may have limited applicability to eyewitness 
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testimony in its standard form because most eyewitness testimony is based on 
visually perceived material, and the GSS1 and GSS2 only present verbal information.  
In this way they proposed that the GSS1 and GSS2 may in fact overestimate the 
suggestibility of people with intellectual disabilities as IQ is strongly positively 
correlated with performance on memory tasks. 
The results from Cardone and Dent‟s (1996) study do, however, support 
Gudjonsson and Clark‟s (1986) theoretical model which posits that multimodal input 
is thought to aid the encoding and recall of memory traces (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992) 
and thus increase participants‟ resistance to leading questions (i.e. lead to lower 
„Yield‟ scores).  Therefore, the more information a person remembers, the less likely 
they will be to yield to leading questions. „Shift‟ is considered to be more closely 
related to personality, experience and coping mechanisms (Sharrock & Gudjonsson, 
1993) and is therefore likely to be less affected by multimodal presentation, as was 
found in the study.   
Everington and Fulero (1999) later used an adapted version of the GSS 1 which 
included a narrative passage simplified to a second grade reading ability and 
abbreviated to just 12 leading questions and 8 non-leading questions.  They assessed 
a group of 18 defendants with ID and 30 defendants without ID with this modified 
version of the GSS 1 and found that both „Yield‟ and „Shift‟ scores were elevated for 
the defendants with ID.   
However, a number of problems have been identified with this study.  Firstly, 
using an adapted and abbreviated, rather than the full translated version of the GSS, 
affects the measure‟s reliability and validity.  Secondly, there was a small sample of 
ID participants so the generalisability of the findings is questionable, and thirdly 
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participants in the control group were only assumed to be of „average‟ intelligence by 
the authors as they did not formally assess the intellectual ability of this group.  
A similar study by Milne, Clare and Bull (2002) in the UK found that 
participants who recalled more correct information in the free recall stage were less 
susceptible to misleading questions both prior to („Yield 1‟) and following („Yield 
2‟) negative feedback.  Similarly, the group of participants with presumed ID yielded 
to leading questions significantly more than their „general population‟ counterparts.  
There was no significant difference in „Shift‟ scores, as found in Cardone and Dent‟s 
(1996) study.  
This study compared two groups‟ performance on an adapted version of the 
GSS.  Participants in the first group (n=47) were presumed to have an ID on the basis 
of their use of day services for people with ID.  Participants in the comparison group 
(n=38) were recruited through the local job centre and through a newspaper 
advertisement in Cambridge, and many were employed and/or had academic 
qualifications.   Participants‟ IQ was not formally assessed.  Participants in both 
groups watched a three-minute video recording edited from an educational film about 
road safety which contained both visual and auditory information.  The event was 
chosen because it was dramatic and realistic without being upsetting.  Participants 
were then assessed with a suggestibility measure based on the GSS.  The adapted 
scale consisted of 12 questions, of which four were „leading‟, four were „false 
alternatives‟ and four were „non-leading‟ questions relating to correct information.  
As in the GSS, participants were then given negative feedback and were assessed 
again with the same 12 questions.  Instructions given to participants were the same as 
those provided by Gudjonsson (1997, p.11). 
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Criticisms of this study include the fact that the authors did not assess 
participants‟ IQ.  Therefore, the extent of ID among participants in the ID group is 
unknown.  In addition, it could be argued that the participants from the „general 
population‟ sample were not representative of the wider population as some had 
undergraduate and even postgraduate degrees, and similarly most participants from 
both groups were White British.  Nevertheless, the authors concluded that the 
similarity of their findings to those of previous studies by Gudjonsson (1984; 1997) 
support the GSS as being a useful measure of vulnerability to misleading questions 
and interrogative pressure.   
White and Willner (2005) devised two alternative suggestibility scales (ASS1 
and ASS2) based on events that had taken place in a learning disability service.  The 
ASS1 and ASS2 were constructed to resemble as closely as possible the GSS, using a 
story with a comparable word count, facts, leading questions and true items, 
administered in an identical manner and providing the same five measures.  The 
ASS1 story described the rebranding of one of the day centres (Centre E) at an open 
day that included displays of service users‟ work and a ceremony attended by the 
mayor.  The ASS2 story described an outing to the annual Christmas party at the 
same day centre.   
In Experiment 1, one experimental group of service users (n=20) who had 
witnessed the event detailed in the ASS1, and one control group of service users 
(n=20) who had not, were compared in terms of their performance on the ASS1, 
GSS2, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) and 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintillie, 1982) 
six months after the ASS1 event had taken place.  Experiment 2 concerned a 
different event described in the GSS2 that took place approximately six months after 
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the end of Experiment 1.  One month after this event took place, service users who 
had witnessed the event (n=16) and those who had not (n=12) were assessed with the 
GSS2.  This experiment was conducted to investigate whether the effects in 
Experiment 1 increased if participants were assessed with more salient material.   
The results showed that participants recalled greater amounts of information 
and were significantly less suggestible in relation to the experienced situation 
compared to the standard verbally presented passage, particularly when the event had 
taken place just a month previously as opposed to 18 months previously.  In fact, 
participants‟ suggestibility scores in Experiment 2 were significantly lower than the 
general population norms for the GSS2 (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
This study addressed concerns raised in earlier studies by imposing a stricter 
criterion for inclusion in the ID group (FSIQ below 70, as assessed by the WASI) in 
line with current and accepted ICD-10 classification.  The tests were also 
administered in a counterbalanced order to reduce order effects.  It is unfortunate that 
the authors only recruited a relatively small sample size as only tentative conclusions 
can be made.  Although the experimenter‟s response following the first recall was 
modified as the authors felt the wording in the GSS manual risked jeopardising the 
respondents‟ relationships with the psychology service, the potential confounding 
effect of this was minimised by the authors changing the wording for both the GSS2 
and ASS and ASS2 in the same way. 
Henry and Gudjonsson (2007) later compared 16 12 year old and 18 8/9 year 
old children with ID with 20 12 year old and 20 8/9 year old typically-developing 
children on a previously-used eyewitness memory task (Henry & Gudjonsson, 2004) 
to examine whether there were developmental improvements in eyewitness memory 
performance and tendency to yield to leading questions with age.  To establish IQ 
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and approximate mental age, the younger typically-developing children and all the 
children with ID were assessed with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second 
Edition (Dunn et al., 1997) and the pattern constructions subtest from the British 
Ability Scale – Second Edition (BAS-II; Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996), whereas 
the older typically-developing children were assessed with the verbal and nonverbal 
reasoning subtests of the BAS-II.  Measures of both verbal and nonverbal 
intelligence were included to test for possible differences between their respective 
relations with the eyewitness measures.  All children also completed the Speed of 
Information Processing subtest from the BAS-II (Elliott, Kay & McCullouch, 1996) 
to examine the relationship between speed of information processing and eyewitness 
performance.  All the children then took part in the eyewitness memory task and 
interview as described in Henry and Gudjonsson (2004) except there was no repeated 
presentation condition in this study. 
In the final phase of the testing session all children were assessed with a 
slightly shortened and modified version of the GSS 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987).  The 
experimenters shortened the GSS 2 to make the task easier for the least able 
participants.  Only the first 80% of the story (32 out of 40 units of information) was 
presented, followed by asking the first 80% of questions (16 out of 20 questions) of 
which 2 were non-leading and 12 were leading, to mirror the original GSS 2.  
Additionally, some wording in the story was simplified (e.g. „bungalow‟ was 
replaced with „house‟.  As recommended in the manual for people with ID, there was 
no delay between free recall and answering the questions for all the children. 
Significant positive correlations were found between performance on the GSS 
free recall and eyewitness free recall, and GSS „Yield‟ scores and performance on 
the eyewitness misleading specific questions.  As expected, GSS „Shift‟ scores did 
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not correlate with any of the eyewitness memory variables.  These results replicate 
previous findings using live acted scenes (Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999, 2003) and 
extends them to a video-presented scene.  The results support the GSS 2 being a 
good predictor of eyewitness performance. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with group (ID and 
typically-developing [TD]) and age (8/9 years and 12 years) as between subject 
factors revealed overall significant effects of age group and ID group on 
performance.  Older children recalled more information about the video, and this 
improvement in free recall was greater in the children with ID compared to the TD 
children.  However, there were no developmental improvements in the other 
measures of eyewitness performance. 
There were, however, marked effects of ID group as found in earlier studies.  
Whilst the children with ID gave fewer items of incorrect information during open-
ended recall compared to the TD children, they recalled significantly less 
information on the free recall, general questions, and non-leading specific questions.  
The children with ID yielded significantly more than TD children on both types of 
„biased‟ questions (misleading specific and misleading yes/no questions) and were 
more likely to agree with the suggestion offered  on correctly-leading yes/no 
questions.  As in previous studies (Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999, 2003), overall 
accuracy during open-ended recall was uniformly high across the groups, regardless 
of age or the presence of an ID. 
There was also a significant positive relationship between speed of 
information processing (SIP) and performance on the free recall and non-leading 
specific questions of the eyewitness memory task in the children with ID. Faster 
cognitive operations may have enabled those with ID to assimilate the scenes more 
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rapidly and fully and therefore provide more accurate and detailed responses to 
straightforward, unbiased questions.  In the TD children SIP was related to 
suggestibility in response to misleading yes/no questions.  The authors propose that 
perhaps most of the TD children were able to assimilate the basic facts about the 
scene whereas those with even faster rates of processing were able to attend to more 
subtle features of the scene which aided them in resisting misleading questions. 
Additionally, there were more significant correlations between verbal and 
nonverbal mental age and the eyewitness memory variables than for IQ and the 
eyewitness memory variables, particularly for the children with ID.  Therefore, 
forensic assessments that describe a child‟s, and perhaps where possible adult‟s, 
mental age may provide a better indicator of likely eyewitness memory performance 
than chronological age and/or IQ. 
The authors acknowledged some limitations of the study.  Firstly, due to 
experimenter error 10 narratives had to be omitted from the ID group so free recall 
data was unavailable for these participants. Secondly, compared to real forensic 
contexts, the eyewitness memory interview was very soon after the children watched 
the video, the children were interviewed at their school and therefore in a familiar 
place, and the interview was friendly and encouraging.  In forensic contexts, there 
are often much longer delays between witnessing and being interviewed about an 
event, in addition to a range of additional internal and external pressures, such as 
uncertainty, expectations and pressures which people with ID may find it more 
difficult to cope with.  These issues may therefore impact on the ability to 
confidently generalise the findings from this study to the real world.  
Overall, however, these findings suggest that GSS 2 free recall may have 
utility in predicting individual performance on measures of relatively „unbiased‟ 
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recall in eyewitness interviews and accuracy of free recall was very high, even for 
the children with ID.  Take together, in forensic contexts free recall could be 
considered to be fairly accurate in children with ID and to be moderately well 
predicted by a simple test of story recall (from the GSS 2 or broader measures of 
verbal memory.)  Additionally, the GSS 2 appears to demonstrate at least some 
degree of specificity in terms of how its component measures (free recall, „Yield‟ 
and „Shift‟) relate to eyewitness memory performance, although these relationships 
appear to be somewhat stronger in children with ID than TD-children.  
Willner (2008) later went on to conduct a similar study to his earlier one 
(White & Wilner, 2005), but this time compared the impact of using a measure of 
recognition memory with just free recall and the impact of providing multiple 
presentations of the story in the suggestibility test on the tendency to „yield‟ and 
„shift‟.  Like before, all participants had an ID and were assessed with the WASI and 
BPVS to establish IQ.  Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were assessed with a 
modified version of the GSS2 in which the five yes-no questions were replaced with 
10 questions offering a choice between a true and false answer (GSS-R) providing a 
measure of recognition memory.  In Experiment 3 participants were assessed with 
the ASS3, which was comparable to the ASS1 and ASS2 used in the earlier study 
(White & Willner, 2005), except it described a different event that had taken place 
one month prior to this study. 
In Experiment 1, the suggestibility scores of one group of participants (Group 
2) administered with the GSS-R were compared with a second group (Group 1) who 
had the GSS-R story split into two halves with recall, leading questions and 
recognition memory questions after each half.  In Experiment 2, the suggestibility 
scores of Group 1 assessed with the GSS-R were compared with the scores of Group 
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2, who had the story presented three times with recall after each reading („multiple 
presentation‟ procedure) and the questions presented at the end.  In Experiment 3, 
participants were assessed with the ASS-3.  Half of the participants in this 
experiment had experienced the event described in the ASS3 and half had not.  
The fact that some of the participants had taken part in a previous study 
(White & Willner, 2005) was controlled for by ensuring that half of the participants 
in each of Groups 1 and 2 had previous experience with this procedure while the 
other half did not.   
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs, with the within-subject factors of 
condition (standard or modified) and modification (divided or multiple) were used 
for participants from Groups 1 and 2 who had participated in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare the performance of participants in 
Experiment 3.  Specific comparisons within and between experiments were made 
using t-tests.   
The results showed that the three groups were comparable in age, gender, IQ 
and performance on the GSS2.  In Experiment 1, divided presentation significantly 
increased recall but had no significant effect on either recognition memory or 
suggestibility.  In Experiment 2, however, multiple presentation increased recall and 
recognition memory and decreased participants‟ total suggestibility scores.  In 
Experiment 3, participants showed increases in both recall and recognition memory, 
as well as significant decreases in „Yield‟, „Shift‟ and „total suggestibility‟.  When 
comparing performance across all conditions, suggestibility was lowest when 
participants were assessed about events they had actually witnessed (Experiment 3).  
Additionally, the effects on suggestibility were mostly due to performance on the 
forced-choice recognition memory task.      
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  The authors therefore concluded that their study supported previous findings 
(and ones discussed next in this review) that the GSS1 and GSS2 likely overestimate 
the suggestibility of a person in relation to a personally significant event.  The results 
from studies using the GSS are therefore considered to represent poor recognition 
memory for the material being tested, rather than increased suggestibility per se. 
 Both these studies suggest that the GSS1 and GSS2 overestimate the 
tendency of people with ID to yield to leading questions in relation to an 
experienced, significant event.  They also propose that the difference in performance 
on suggestibility tests between people with ID and people without ID may be due 
more to having to recall rather than recognise material using a true-false recognition 
procedure. 
To conclude this section, the studies discussed reveal findings that generally 
support those described in the previous section, particularly with regard to the 
distinction between „Yield‟ and „Shift‟, the significant positive relationship between 
memory and „Yield‟ scores on the GSS and GSS2, and the increased tendency of 
children and adults with ID (particularly moderate ID) to yield to leading questions 
when compared with non-ID controls.  It is therefore posited that because 
participants with ID are able to recall less information they show themselves to be 
more suggestible, not that they are more suggestible per se.  Studies discussed in this 
section of the review examined this issue by investigating the impact of modifying 
the presentation of the GSS and GSS 2 on memory for the story and suggestibility.  
Presenting the story in two formats (e.g. read aloud with pictures, or video with 
sound) has been shown to improve immediate and delayed recall and lead to lower 
„Yield‟ scores (but had no impact on „Shift‟ scores as expected), most likely because 
input from more than one modality is likely to result in a more elaborate memory 
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trace in associative memory than one would expect from one modality alone.  
However, people with ID still appear to yield more to leading questions than their 
non-ID counterparts even after having the story presented in multiple formats.   
Two studies also found that participants with ID recalled more information 
and were significantly less likely to yield to leading questions about an experienced 
event, particularly one that was one month earlier as opposed to 18 months 
previously, than about an event that was simply read aloud to them.  Moreover, the 
suggestibility scores of those participants with ID who had experienced the event 
were approximately the same as for the general population norms for the GSS 2 
(Gudjonsson, 1997).  These studies highlight the distinction between two kinds of 
memory: memory for a narrative passage and memory for events and whether 
material from these two types of memory is recalled from the same or different 
memory systems.  Thus, the poorer performance of individuals with ID on the GSSs 
could reflect cognitive deficits in semantic memory but may not necessarily predict 
performance when autobiographical event memory is the subject of investigation. 
Studies investigating the impact of different types of questioning on the 
amount and accuracy of information recalled and suggestibility have found that 
children with ID recall less information in response to free recall, general questions 
and non-leading specific questions than children without ID, but their overall 
percentage accuracy is at the same level as their non-ID counterparts.  Children with 
ID also seem to yield more to biased questions (misleading specific and misleading 
yes/no questions) and are more likely to agree with suggestions on correct-leading 
yes/no questions.   
This review will now examine further the effect of changing the style of 
questioning on performance on a modified assessment of suggestibility. 
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Studies using an alternative format to the GSS 
It is not only the format of the presentation of the narrative in the GSS that 
has been investigated for its impact on „Yield‟ and „Shift‟, but also the style of 
questioning used.  Table 3 provides a description of a Canadian study by Perlman, 
Ericson, Esses and Isaacs (1994) which employed an adapted format, and not the 
GSS or GSS 2, to compare the amount and accuracy of information provided by 
participants with and without ID in response to different question formats.   
In this study, 30 participants identified through medical records to be within 
the mild and borderline ID range (IQ 55-80) were compared with a comparison 
group of 30 participants (a high percentage were University students) assumed to 
have no ID in terms of their ability to report a witnessed event.  Participants‟ IQ was 
not formally assessed.  All participants watched a seven-minute film depicting a 
failed murder plot and were then asked to freely recall all the information they could 
remember from the film, and then to recount the film‟s events in response to five 
question formats.  These included very general questions, 16 short-answer questions, 
16 questions requiring a recognition Yes/No response, and lastly 16 statement 
questions with some requiring a Yes/No response.  Half the questions of each type 
were correct-leading and half were false-leading.  These were very different to the 
format of the GSSs in which 20 specific questions are asked about the content of the 
narrative, of which 15 are misleading or present false alternatives and only the 
remaining five acted as „filler‟ questions.   
In the free recall format, although participants with ID recalled significantly 
less information than participants with no ID, the percentage of correctly recalled 
information was only marginally less (81.5% compared with 89.4%) and was 
considerably higher than the average of 25% correct recall for participants with ID in  
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Table 3 
   
Description of individual studies using an alternative, adapted format  
Author (date) Sample Design Measures 
Perlman, 
Ericson, Esses 
and Isaacs 
(1994) 
Canadian sample. Between groups (2) design 
comparing amount and 
accuracy of information 
recalled by participants with 
and without ID in response to 
different question formats 
Eyewitness memory task: free recall; very general 
questions; 16 short-answer questions; 16 yes/no 
questions; 16 statement questions with some 
requiring yes/no response. The following scores 
calculated: 
Group 1:N=30 adults with ID (15 males, 15 
females); age range: 17-26 years; IQ 55-80; 
recruited from research and counselling centre in 
Toronto.  
 Group 2: N=30 adults without ID (15 males, 15 
females); recruited through advertisement (57% 
were university students). 
Correct information score 
  
Incorrect information score 
  
Irrelevant information score 
      Percentage accuracy  
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the immediate free recall task of the narrative in Clare and Gudjonsson‟s (1993) and 
Everington and Fulero‟s (1999) studies.  Therefore most of the information in free 
recall by both groups was accurate.   
Similar results were found when participants were asked very general 
questions, although in this condition both groups provided a comparable percentage 
of correct information.  Control participants provided more detailed answers for 
questions pertaining to suppositions or inferences.   
On the non-leading short-answer questions, participants with ID recalled 
relevant but less salient information.  Although control participants provided 
significantly more correct information, there was no difference between the groups in 
terms of incorrect or irrelevant information recalled.  However, control participants 
did provide a significantly greater percentage of correct information, indicating that 
people with ID provide less accurate and detailed information in response to more 
focused recall questions.  On the misleading short-answer questions, participants 
with ID received significantly lower scores than control participants on only three 
out of the eight questions.  Additionally, all participants were less susceptible to 
fabrication when questioned about information pertaining to the key scenes in the 
film. 
There was no significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
percentage of accurate responses to correct-leading specific and statement questions, 
but there was a difference with false-leading specific and statement questions; 
although participants with ID still recalled 84% of information correctly in the latter 
condition.  Analysis of individual questions found only one with statistically 
significant difference between the groups.   
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The authors therefore concluded that participants with ID generally recalled 
almost as much correct information as participants without ID when asked structured 
specific questions requiring recognition-type responses, structured questions with 
open answers and concerning information pertaining to the central action of the film.  
The finding that people with ID provide less correct information in response to 
misleading short-answer questions and more errors on false-leading specific and 
statement questions is potentially due to the impact of being assessed by an authority 
figure.  Studies examining the impact of interviewer behaviour are presented in the 
discussion section of this review.  
Although Perlman et al.‟s (1994) study addressed concerns of other studies 
by only recruiting participants for the ID sample who had known IQs between 55 and 
80, participants in the comparison group were not assessed in terms of their IQ.   In 
general, though, the results suggest that there may be ways, in addition to the 
variation of presentation of the material to be learned, to facilitate report accuracy 
among people with intellectual disabilities.  In particular, they suggest that free recall 
combined with asking specific questions can help performance and that short-answer 
questions (especially misleading ones) and leading statement questions can hinder 
performance. 
 
Discussion 
The GSS1 and GSS2 have been used in a large volume of research with 
participants of average intellectual ability and forensic populations (Gudjonsson, 
1992) and more recently in a smaller number of studies with participants with 
intellectual disabilities.  Early studies using the GSS1 and GSS2 found that people 
with ID are more suggestible than their average ability counterparts.  
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However, studies using the GSS to measure suggestibility in people with 
intellectual disabilities have been criticised for not ensuring that all of the 
participants meet the currently accepted criteria for a diagnosis of an „intellectual 
disability‟ (Beail, 2002; Cardone & Dent, 1996), either because they used different 
criteria or because they did not formally assess each participant‟s IQ level.  Also, 
none of the studies described in this review reported whether and to what degree 
participants were experiencing any psychological difficulties.  Psychiatric disorders 
are more common among people with intellectual disabilities than people of average 
intelligence and therefore it is not known to what degree this could have been a 
confounding variable, particularly for the ID group.  
Importantly, Beail (2002) also questioned the assumption of a relationship 
between the test situation and the real-life situation. He concluded that the GSS may 
be limited in their applicability to criminal justice proceedings because „the results 
are based on an examination of semantic memory, whereas police interviews are 
more concerned with episodic or autobiographical event memory. Also, experienced 
events usually involve multi-modal sensory input resulting in a more elaborate trace 
in associative memory‟ (p. 135). Therefore people with intellectual disabilities may 
be unfairly assumed to be more likely to yield to leading questions when during a 
real-life event their autobiographical memory is often sound, as in the landmark case 
of „Mary‟ (Gudjonsson & Gunn, 1982). 
Gudjonsson (2003) has acknowledged the potential influence of memory on 
suggestibility: „The poorer the subject‟s memory the more suggestible he or she is 
likely to be... One does not know whether it is memory capacity per se which makes 
subjects more susceptible to suggestions, or the fact that they have poor recall about 
the subject matter on which they are questioned.‟ (p. 384-385). White and Willner 
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(2005) argued that their study provides evidence for the significant factor impacting 
yield scores being memory for the event rather than memory capacity per se.  
However, in general the findings in this review indicate that some people with 
intellectual disabilities may be more easily misled by the interviewer when being 
questioned than people from the general population. Additionally, „Yield‟ scores, i.e. 
the tendency of interviewees to give in to leading questions, appear to differentiate 
ID from non-ID groups better than „Shift‟ scores (E.g. Cardone & Dent, 1996; 
Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; Milne et al., 2002), although Everington and Fulero 
(1999) found that both Yield and Shift scores were elevated in defendants with ID. 
The finding that there is a greater difference in Yield than Shift scores 
between ID and non-ID children suggests that for children with ID their memory for 
the event  is an important moderating variable for „Yield 1‟ type of suggestibility but 
that this difference is slightly less marked in adults (E.g. Gudjonsson & Henry, 
2003).  This finding is further supported by studies showing that when people with 
ID are assessed regarding experienced events, creating a greater memory trace, they 
are often no more suggestible than their average ability counterparts (E.g.White & 
Wilner, 2005; Wilner, 2008).  Similarly, immediate recall does not appear to have a 
significant moderating effect on „Shift‟ in either adults or children, supporting the 
theory (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986) that „Shift‟ is more related the ability to cope 
with interrogative pressure, such as negative feedback and repeated questioning and 
is more influenced by certain personality, interpersonal and social characteristics and 
experience.  An alternative explanation for the lack of significantly different „Shift‟ 
scores between people with and without ID may simply reflect how people with ID 
try to cope with the negative feedback by simply repeating the response they gave 
initially. 
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The findings within this review do suggest, however, that based on 
performance on the GSS it could be considered wrong to assume that someone would 
be unreliable during testimony/cross-examination.  They could be suggestible on the 
abstract and impersonal test material of the GSS but not when questioned about 
actual personal events, presuming they have had some personal association with the 
material in question (e.g. White & Willner, 2005; Willner, 2008).  This emphasises 
the importance of clinicians interpreting test scores alongside evidence of 
suggestibility in the actual case material (e.g. police interview transcript, clinical 
observations at interview).  Indeed, Gudjonsson (1997; p.29) argues that in relation 
to admissions in a police interview, the GSS1/2 are only relevant if the individual 
was asked leading questions or was pressured by the interviewer.  Making legal 
decisions (such as ruling on the admissibility of a police interview or ruling that 
someone should be treated differently during cross-examination) solely on the test 
scores alone could be flawed. 
This review also highlighted that the question format can influence 
performance on tests of suggestibility.  Milne et al. (1999) have recommended using 
the cognitive interview format to produce the best evidence and similarly Perlman et 
al. (1994) found the use of structured specific questions requiring recognition-type 
responses and structured questions requiring open answers elicited the most accurate 
and detailed responses from people with ID.  Importantly, it seems that provided that 
questions are phrased simply, are not leading, and there is a clear recognition that the 
response „I don‟t know‟ is allowed, witnesses with ID may be just as reliable as other 
witnesses (Perlman et al., 1994; White & Willner, 2005; Willner, 2008).  
Additionally, fairly recent studies using university undergraduates (Bain & 
Baxter, 2000; Baxter & Boon, 2000) have also highlighted the impact of interviewer 
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behaviour on performance on the GSS1 and GSS2.  Both found an „abrupt‟ 
interviewer style led to higher scores for both „Shift‟ and „Total Suggestibility‟ than a 
„friendly‟ style, but had no impact on „yield‟ scores (Bain & Baxter, 2000).  Not only 
do their studies provide more support for Gudjonsson‟s argument that the „Yield 2‟ 
measure is most sensitive to vulnerability to interrogative pressure, but also for the 
idea that interviewer style is another variable which needs to be taken into account 
when assessing and interviewing people, particularly in a legal context.  It would be 
interesting for further research to investigate this finding using people with ID.   
 
Implications for research 
 Future research on the suggestibility of people with intellectual disabilities 
needs to change direction and return to the case of Mary (Gudjonsson & Gunn 1982). 
In this way, it may prove beneficial to develop an assessment procedure that provides 
valid information on episodic or autobiographical event memory rather than semantic 
memory as the GSSs do.   
A further area of research also concerns the possible interactive effects of 
retention interval and question format on accuracy in reporting. Further studies, 
particularly using experienced eyewitness events, could provide additional support 
for some of the findings discussed in this review and extend them to examine the 
relationship between performance on different eyewitness tasks and additional 
cognitive variables, such as speed of information processing, or other non-cognitive 
variables and characteristics of people with ID.  For example, it would be interesting 
to investigate whether any differences in suggestibility exist between individuals 
with ID living in supported accommodation and those living independently.  
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Additionally, it would be interesting to extend the investigation of the impact of 
interviewer behaviour on children and adults with ID.  
 
Clinical and legal implications 
The studies discussed in this review highlight potential clinical and legal 
implications, such as spending time informing witnesses and defendants with ID 
about their right to oppose comments made by lawyers, or avoiding certain questions 
or interviewer behaviour that may make the individual with ID more prone to 
suggestibility.  For example, the finding that children with ID show a tendency to 
change their answers to specific questions more frequently in repeated recall sessions 
implies that children with ID may suffer more through the repeated interviews that 
are characteristic of the legal process.  Repeated interviews could therefore be 
avoided where possible.   
Great caution should also be exercised in using misleading closed questions 
with adults and children with ID.  If misleading closed questions are asked, 
particularly during cross-examination, great care should be exercised in interpreting 
the responses.  Additionally, for the majority of the studies discussed in this review 
the „interrogation‟ was potentially not particularly stressful.  It is therefore possible 
that the suggestibility effects may vary in more stressful situations, when events are 
more dramatic and when questions are repeated.  Children and adults with ID may 
show a greater reduction in their ability to cope with the uncertainty, expectations 
and pressures of a more stressful or traumatic interview.  Therefore, some cautionary 
measures should be taken, for example, interviewing the defendant or witness as 
soon as possible after the alleged event, allowing children and adults with ID to give 
unaided free recall first, using extreme care when interpreting responses to leading 
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questions, and avoiding the repetition of questions may be appropriate when 
questioning children and adults with ID.  However, only rigorous training models 
that span an interviewer‟s career and adequate supervision in the workplace will help 
the transference of appropriate questioning skills into the field. 
Overall, the papers discussed emphasise that a high suggestibility score on the 
GSS and other tests of suggestibility only highlights a potential vulnerability and 
should be interpreted with caution and in the context of, not in isolation from, the 
circumstances of any given case (Gudjonsson, 2003).  This review also raises an 
important issue that people with intellectual disabilities are not a homogenous group 
and demonstrate important individual differences (Kebbell & Hatton, 1999).  
Therefore, in line with the presumption of capacity, people with intellectual 
disabilities should be enabled as much as possible to provide accurate and reliable 
information unless proven otherwise.  Denial of the right for victims, defendants and 
witnesses with intellectual disabilities to provide evidence on the basis of an 
assumption about their reliability is both scientifically and morally unjustifiable. 
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Abstract 
Aim: Very little attention has been given to the relationship between intellectual 
disability and the specific legal question (and test) of fitness to plead and stand trial. 
This study aimed to investigate how and to what extent impairments due to a mild 
intellectual disability affect the mental skills central to „fitness to plead‟.   
Method: This between-groups non-experimental study compared the performance of 
a group of adult participants with mild intellectual disability (N=19) with a control 
group of adults with no intellectual disability (N=109) on a newly developed  
15-minute filmed representation of typical court proceedings, during which they 
were asked questions based on the Pritchard criteria of fitness to plead.  Participants 
were also assessed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-3
rd
 edition, two 
subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale-3
rd
 edition and a test of theory of mind.   
Results: Participants with mild ID performed significantly worse than the comparison 
group on the fitness to plead task.  Additional qualitative observations suggested that 
although participants with mild ID were able to grasp the superficial detail of the 
case, they seemed to find it more difficult than participants in the comparison group 
to understand and retain more complex details of the case and to describe the roles of 
key personnel within the court. 
Conclusions: The above findings strongly indicate the need to modify court 
processes to meet the needs of people with ID.  Further research will enable a greater 
understanding of the precise extent and nature of the poorer performance of people 
with ID and contribute to the development of appropriate supporting measures. 
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Introduction 
According to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, 1950), every person is entitled to „a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal‟.  In England and Wales, the concept of „fitness to 
plead‟ (FTP) refers to whether the defendant is mentally capable of fairly standing 
trial, i.e. is able to adequately comprehend the course of the proceedings (Rogers et 
al., 2008).  When the FTP issue arises during a trial, the current law states that the 
judge decides on fitness. If FTP is questioned by the defence or judge, the basis of 
the decision is on „balance of probabilities‟, but if questioned by the prosecution it is 
decided on the basis of „beyond reasonable doubt‟. 
The five legal „Pritchard criteria‟ currently used to determine fitness were 
developed from legal cases (E.g. R v Dyson, 1831; R v Pritchard, 1836): a defendant 
must be able to plead, understand evidence, understand court proceedings, instruct a 
lawyer, and must know that a juror can be challenged.  A trial must not proceed 
where these abilities are lacking (R v Podola, 1960).  A referral for a psychiatric or 
psychological opinion regarding whether the defendant is capable of standing trial 
involves assessing fitness by evaluating the mental health and cognitive ability of the 
defendant and considering how this will impact upon the various aspects of the 
Pritchard criteria. Clinical decision-making about the degree of impact is ultimately 
subjective and is therefore plagued by inconsistent and arbitrary decision-making 
(Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup & Watts, 2009).  
Formal findings of unfitness are extremely rare: in England and Wales there 
were only 66 findings of unfitness per year between 1997 and 2001 (Mackay, 
Mitchell & Howe, 2007).  Furthermore, an appraisal of the use of the legal criteria 
found that 40% of psychiatric court reports did not mention FTP at all, and that only 
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one third made a statement about FTP that was supported by reference to the legal 
criteria (Larkin & Collins, 1989; Rogers et al., 2009).  Potentially, therefore, 
mentally ill and cognitively impaired individuals are standing trial when they are 
unable to properly participate in the proceedings.  
 
Intellectual disability 
There are a number of different terms currently in use for what shall be 
referred to here as „intellectual disability‟ (ID).  The white paper Valuing People 
(Department of Health, 2001) defines an ID as: „a significantly reduced ability to 
understand new or complex information and to learn new skills (impaired 
intelligence); and a reduced ability to cope independently (impaired social 
functioning)‟ (P.14).  These difficulties must be present before adulthood and have 
had lasting effects on development.  This description emphasises that the presence of 
a low intelligence quotient, for example an IQ below 70, is not, of itself, sufficient 
for a diagnosis of ID; evidence of impaired intelligence and impaired social 
functioning must be present.   
 
Intellectual disability and the court 
Individuals with ID can of course come into contact with the criminal justice 
system both as witnesses and defendants (Murphy and Mason, 1999).  However, very 
little research has examined the issue of capacity in relation to the fundamental and 
specific (pre-trial) legal question of FTP and stand trial. Research relating to the 
treatment of individuals with ID as defendants in police custody, at police interview 
and in court will now be briefly reviewed to highlight the known vulnerabilities of 
people with ID within this area of the criminal justice system, before turning back to 
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the issue of the potential vulnerabilities of people with ID in understanding and 
following court proceedings.   
 
Defendants in police custody and when testifying at trial 
Point of arrest  
The Codes of Practice associated with the police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE: Home Office, 1984), in particular Code C, contain guidance for 
officers should they know or suspect that a person they detain has intellectual 
disabilities.  However, this guidance is somewhat confusing, particularly in its 
reference to „mental handicap‟ to include both intellectual disabilities and mental 
illness, despite expecting officers to understand that they are separate entities. 
Compounding the issue, only one third of a sample of UK police officers participated 
in training about intellectual disability and three-quarters of those who did participate 
reported that the training was inadequate (Mencap, 1997).   
The Police „Notice to Detained Persons‟ is an aspect of police procedure 
thought to cause particular difficulties for people with intellectual disabilities.  The 
notice provides suspects with information about the caution and their rights while the 
police detain them.  Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) found that only people with an IQ 
of at least 111 were able to understand this official version, whereas their 
experimental re-written version was simpler to understand than the most basic daily 
tabloid.  This study highlights that people cannot exercise their rights if they are 
unable to comprehend or recall them, and therefore individuals should only be 
considered fit to be interviewed if it is clear they have understood their caution.  
Furthermore, Sigelman et al. (1982) found the lower the participant‟s IQ, the more 
likely they were to agree with statements put to them. 
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In another example, the New South Wales Reform Commission in Australia 
found that people with intellectual disabilities tended to be unaware of their legal 
rights; more than three-quarters of those interviewed said that they would sign 
anything the police requested (NSW Law Commission, 1996).  In addition, many 
offenders over-estimated police powers, for example they believed they could be 
placed in an institution by police against their will.  Furthermore, they tend to be 
compliant or suggestible, especially with authority figures, partly due to low self-
esteem and poor coping skills (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2003). 
These studies emphasise the importance of making available „appropriate 
adults‟ for vulnerable adults.  According to PACE (1984) the role of the „appropriate 
adult‟, ideally a professional trained to undertake the role, is to „support, advise and 
assist‟ detainees in a police station who are either juveniles under the age of 17, or 
adults who are mentally vulnerable.  Duties might include checking the custody 
record, ensuring a person knows why they have been detained, and intervening in the 
interview if necessary.  However, Robertson, Pearson and Gibb (1996) found that an 
appropriate adult was only used in a limited number of cases and many fewer than 
predicted would be necessary, which raised concern that the need for such support is 
being overlooked. Furthermore, Gendle and Woodhams (2005) identified that the 
appropriate adult was not always appropriate: sometimes they appeared to be an 
untrustworthy or unassertive family member of the suspect, or worse, appeared to 
heavily influence the answers of the suspect. 
In a different step towards assisting defendants with ID to better understand 
the Criminal Justice System, Hollins, Murphy and Clare (1996) wrote two books, 
„You‟re under arrest‟ and „You‟re on trial‟, for people with ID to help familiarise 
them with the process and aid understanding.  Using a pictorial format these books 
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tell a story of a man being taken to the police station for questioning; it follows the 
man through to appearances in court and a final hearing. The pictures are designed to 
be self-explanatory and understood by people with intellectual disabilities. 
 
Testimony in court  
Surprisingly little research has been undertaken specifically regarding people 
with ID on trial as opposed to acting as witnesses, although research into the latter, 
particularly regarding interrogative suggestibility, can be generalised to defendants 
with ID. For example, it may be agreed by both sides that a defendant needs to be 
cross-examined with care due to a heightened level of interrogative suggestibility to 
leading questions.  
 
ID and fitness to plead and stand trial 
As noted above, very little attention has been given to the relationship 
between intellectual disabilities and the specific legal question (and test) of FTP and 
stand trial.  
Although attempts are being made in many UK jurisdictions to institute 
policies and practices to identify those defendants with an ID, there is currently no 
operationalised procedure for screening for unfitness in England and Wales. A 
referral for a psychiatric or psychological assessment therefore often requires the 
arresting police officer, solicitor or barrister involved in the case to recognise mental 
abnormality and request an assessment of fitness.  Referrals for a medico-legal 
assessment usually occur in circumstances where a disability is noticeable or when 
someone is clearly under the care of local services. 
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Individuals with mild or borderline ID are likely to be overlooked (Hayes, 
2007).  The lack of identification of individuals with ID may result in such offenders 
missing out on appropriate defences, safeguards and diversionary options resulting in 
inappropriate and unfair treatment within the Criminal Justice System.   
Under the Mental Capacity Act (Home Office, 2005) a person is presumed to 
be able to make their own decisions „unless all practical steps to help him (or her) to 
make a decision have been taken without success‟ (p.6). To determine incapacity, an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain and an inability to 
make a decision needs to be present.  A person is regarded as lacking the capacity to 
make a specific decision at a specific time if they cannot understand the information 
relevant to the decision, retain that information, use or weigh up that information as 
part of the process of making the decision, or communicate the decision (MCA, 
2005).  
There is a need for a similar functional approach (Home Office, 2005) to the 
assessment of FTP and stand trial, but very little is known about the interaction of a 
person‟s abilities (e.g. cognitive profile, ADL level etc) with the demands of the 
particular „task‟ (i.e. understanding and reasoning about court proceedings).  Just as 
is central to the assessment of mental capacity (Home Office, 2005), a functional 
approach focuses on the interaction between a person‟s abilities, the demands of the 
particular situation or task and the specification of the cognitive and/or psychological 
capacities required to fulfil the demands. 
In North America, formal instruments to assess fitness to plead and stand trial 
(termed „competence to stand trial‟ in the USA) have been developed as an adjunct 
to clinical opinion since the 1960s in line with the functional approach to assessment.  
Rogers et al. (2008) describe 19 instruments, each differing slightly in their purpose, 
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scope, design and the degree to which they have been examined empirically.  They 
vary from checklists (Robey, 1965) to sentence completion tasks (Lipsitt, Lelos & 
McGarry, 1971) and finally „second generation‟ structured interviews with strict 
protocols for administration and scoring, such as the MacArthur Adjudicative 
Competence Assessment (MacCAT-CAT; Hoge et al., 1999; Poythress, Monahan, 
Bonnie, Otto & Hoge, 2002), that address the psychometric shortcomings of the 
earlier tools.  However, despite the availability of all these measures and their use 
found in case law, they do not appear to be commonly used in practice. 
With regards to assessing „competence to stand trial‟ using formal assessment 
tools among people with ID in the USA, only one measure has been found that has 
been specifically adapted for use with this population (Competence Assessment for 
Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation [CAST-MR]; Everington & 
Dunn, 1995).  Additionally, although some measures of competence to stand trial are 
extremely sophisticated with good reliability and validity, concerns have been raised 
about their applicability to people with ID (e.g. Pinals, Tillbrook & Mumley, 2006).  
For example, some of the items of the assessments are difficult for people with ID to 
understand and others require quite advanced abstract reasoning, and ability often 
limited in people with ID. 
In terms of the development of FTP assessment instruments in the UK, only 
the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool – Fitness to Plead (MacCAT-FP; 
Akinkunmi, 2002), a 30-minute interview with criterion-based scoring, has been 
specifically adapted for use in England and Wales.   However, no structured 
instruments are currently routinely used in clinical practice.  The reason for this is 
unclear but may reflect practical time constraints in clinical practice, or a belief that 
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fitness can be adequately assessed without the use of a formal measure and concern 
about the validity and utility of existing measures. 
Currently, assessment in the UK relies upon individual clinical opinion as to 
how and to what extent differing cognitive deficits may interfere with performance.  
Although performance on standardised tests (e.g. of comprehension, attention, and 
verbal memory) are used to aid clinical decision-making, the lack of a relevant 
evidence base hinders the ability to generalise IQ scores to actual courtroom 
performance. 
The relationship between domains of cognitive functioning and actual 
„performance‟ in the courtroom has not been investigated.  The absence of an 
empirical basis for the clinical assessment of fitness means that clinical and legal 
judgments of defendants remain critically uninformed (Rogers et al., 2009).  
Additionally, the finding that the Pritchard criteria are applied inconsistently 
(Mackay & Kearns, 2000) suggests that standardised assessments developed in line 
with FTP criteria will provide a more reliable and consistent approach.  Although 
capacity will vary according to the complexity of the case and trial, empirical data 
derived from a relatively straightforward and basic trial will provide valuable 
information on the „minimum‟ cognitive and functional requirements needed to 
understand court proceedings and follow evidence.   
This study is part of a wider research project which aims to examine the 
relationship between cognitive functioning and performance on a newly developed 
FTP task designed to measure fundamental elements of the Pritchard criteria: the 
ability to understand the charge; the nature of entering a plea; understanding the roles 
of court representatives; and comprehending, following and reasoning about the 
actual proceedings to adequately instruct a lawyer.  Crucially, it tests these areas of 
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capacity by aiming to provide a more extensive, naturalistic evaluation of a person‟s 
capacity in relation to the current legal „test‟ (Pritchard) by examining cognitive 
function and ability as closely as possible to the demands involved in actual court 
proceedings (i.e. being in court, hearing evidence and instructing a lawyer).  
The study described here is a preliminary, exploratory investigation of how 
and to what extent impairments due to a mild intellectual disability affect the mental 
skills central to „fitness to plead‟.   
 
Hypotheses 
It is accepted that a range of cognitive abilities are likely to underpin capacity 
in relation to the Pritchard criteria (BPS, 2006; p.68 and p.73) and it therefore 
follows that various cognitive abilities will influence performance on a task designed 
to assess fitness to plead and stand trial.   
The ability to understand what it means to enter a plea of guilty or not-guilty, 
to understand court proceedings and the roles of court personnel, to know that a 
defendant can instruct their lawyer, and to know that a juror can be challenged all 
likely require an understanding of complex language and drawing on acquired 
semantic knowledge and common-sense reasoning.  It is therefore hypothesised that 
performance on these Pritchard criteria will correlate with performance on the 
WAIS-III Verbal IQ (VIQ) and Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI). 
Understanding and following evidence in court, however, is likely to place a 
greater demand on a number of different cognitive capacities.  It will likely require 
an understanding of complex language and the ability to understand and reason about 
concepts therefore drawing on acquired semantic knowledge and common-sense 
reasoning.  Additionally, verbal information delivered in real-time format is likely to 
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place a demand on working memory abilities to temporarily process that information 
in memory and to formulate a response, as well as processing speed i.e. the ability to 
think quickly and efficiently.  Furthermore, it requires the ability to comprehend and 
reason about information over the course of the proceedings in the film and testing 
procedure which takes up to 40 minutes.  Thus there is likely to be a load on episodic 
memory requiring attention to detail, retaining the gist of the information, and 
recalling it.  It is therefore hypothesised that participants‟ ability to retain and recall 
the trial evidence presented during the video will be correlated with all of the WAIS-
III variables and the WMS-III Auditory Immediate (AI) and Auditory Delayed (AD) 
variables, but not the WMS-III Auditory Recognition Delayed (ARD) index.  The 
WMS-III ARD index is not proposed to be related to performance on any aspects of 
the FTP test as it is unlikely that any of the aspects of the FTP test place a load on 
recognition memory. 
It terms of hypotheses about how the performance of participants with and 
without ID will differ on the FTP test, it is hypothesised that participants with mild 
intellectual disability, who will likely have comparably low scores on the WAIS-III 
and WMS-III indices, will perform significantly more poorly on the FTP task (lower 
total score and for each of the five Pritchard criteria) compared to participants with 
no intellectual disability.   
 
Method 
Design 
This was a between-groups (two) non-experimental study.  The independent 
variable was group (participants with mild ID [MID] or participants with no ID 
[Control group]) and the dependent variables were scores for the five Pritchard 
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criteria as measured by the FTP task, total score on the FTP measure, composite 
scores on the WAIS-III and WMS-III and total score on a measure of theory of mind.  
A correlational design also investigated the inter-relationships between the various 
measures of cognitive function and performance on the FTP test. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was granted by South East London REC 4 (Appendix 1) and 
all participants provided written consent to take part in the study. 
To enable the participants with MID to provide informed consent to take part 
in the project, the information sheet and consent form (Appendices 2 and 3) were 
designed to be easily understood by people with an ID. Firstly, information sheets 
and consent forms from previous studies using participants with mild ID were 
reviewed.  Additionally, the Questionnaire Evaluation Aid („QUAID‟; Graesser, 
Wiemer-Hastings, Kreuz, Wiemer-Hastings & Marquis, 2000) was used to ensure 
that the questions were not written using complex language.  Lastly, the information 
sheet and consent form were revised twice on the basis of feedback elicited from 
peer review, which included a clinician and researcher experienced in the area of ID.  
It was also imperative that participants did not feel pressured to agree to take 
part in the study.  It was strongly emphasised that it was the participant‟s choice as to 
whether they wanted to take part in the study and that if they did not wish to take part 
the study would have no impact on their treatment or future decisions about their 
care.  Additionally, they were encouraged to voice any concerns.   
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Recruitment 
All participants were recruited through convenience sampling.  Participants 
with MID were recruited from voluntary organisations and day centres for people 
with ID.  Staff at these centres identified suitable participants for the project based on 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  They then discussed the project with the 
participant and provided them with the information sheet (Appendix 2) and gained 
their consent for the researcher to contact them.  The researcher then met with the 
potential participant to discuss the study in more detail and answer any questions.  If 
the participant agreed to take part in the study, a date and time was arranged for the 
testing session. 
Participants in the comparison group had contacted the research team in 
response to an advertisement requesting participants for the study.  A different 
member of the research team discussed the study over the phone with the potential 
participant and agreed a date and time for the testing session.  All of the participants 
in the comparison group were recruited and tested by another member of the research 
team.  A different information sheet (Appendix 4) and consent form (Appendix 5) 
were given to participants in the comparison group.  As the FTP measure was in 
development, the comparison group of participants needed to be large to enable the 
investigation of the inter-relationship between performance on the WAIS-III and 
WMS-III and performance on the FTP task, in addition to the factor analysis of the 
items within the FTP task and revision of the original measure following this study.  
 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
For both groups, participants‟ first language had to be English; they needed to 
be between 18 and 70 years old; and to be able to provide written consent.  
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Participants were excluded from the study if they had impaired hearing/vision not 
corrected with hearing/visual aids; a diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder; 
previous criminal conviction(s); or current major mental illness (psychosis, bipolar 
disorder, severe anxiety or severe depression).  Participants with mild ID had to have 
a known diagnosis of mild intellectual disability. 
 
Power analysis 
The sample required for this study was determined by a power analysis prior 
to data collection.  Power analysis for this study was informed by prior work by 
Grisso, Appelbaum & Hill-Fitouhi (1997) in which the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool (MacCat-T scale), a measure of competency to stand trial in US 
law, was used in a similar manner in a population of people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, and found an effect size of d=0.51 (large).  Assuming equal group 
sizes, power calculation was carried out using the „G*Power 3‟ computer program 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007), specifying alpha = 5% and desired power 
= 80%.  The required sample size was estimated at 42 with 21 individuals per group.   
 
Participants 
Participants with mild intellectual disability  
This group consisted of 19 participants (10 men, 9 women) with a full scale 
IQ between 51 and 75 (as measured with the WAIS-III) who were between 21 and 62 
years of age (Mean: 34 years; SD 10.8).  13 (68%) were of White ethnicity, four 
(21%) described themselves as Black and two (11%) as Asian.  12 participants left 
school with no qualifications, three with GCSEs, three with Certificates and one with 
an unspecified qualification.   
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13 participants had never attended court before.  Of the six who had, the 
majority (n=4) had attended between one and three times, one between four and six 
times and one between seven and nine times.  Participants had attended court as a 
member of the jury (n=1), as a witness (n=1), as a defendant in relation to a minor 
charge resulting in no criminal conviction (n=3) and as a visitor for work experience 
(n=1).  Most participants (n=8) described themselves as „neither unfamiliar nor 
familiar‟ with court proceedings.  The rest described being „very unfamiliar‟ with 
court proceedings (n=2), „somewhat unfamiliar‟ (n=3), „somewhat familiar‟ (n=5) 
and „very familiar‟ (n=1).   
Participants were asked to provide information about the degree to which 
they had experienced five psychological problems.  Of the 17 (90%) participants who 
provided this information (Table 1), the majority had never or only mildly 
experienced symptoms of anxiety, depression, mania/elation, schizophrenia or 
problems with alcohol and/or drugs. 
 
Table 1  
   
  Experience of psychological difficulties among participants with ID 
  Never  Mild Moderate Severe Missing data 
  n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Anxiety 3 (15.8) 10 (52.6) 4 (21.1) 0 (0) 2 (10.5) 
Depression 3 (15.8) 9 (47.4) 4 (21.1) 1 (5.3) 2 (10.5) 
Elation 8 (42.1) 5 (26.3) 3 (15.8) 1 (5.3) 2 (10.5) 
Psychosis 15 (78.9) 2 (10.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (10.5) 
Alcohol/drugs 16 (84.2) 0 (0) 1 (5.3) 0 (0) 2 (10.5) 
 
On the Psychiatric Assessment Schedule for Adults with Developmental 
Disabilities – Checklist (PAS-ADD-Checklist; Moss et al., 1998) nearly all (n=18) 
participants fell in the below-threshold range for current symptoms of all three 
conditions (organic condition, affective or neurotic disorder and psychotic disorder).  
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Only one participant had a score in the above-threshold range for items indicating 
affective or neurotic disorder, but this did not correspond with their self-reported 
mood during the testing session. 
 
Comparison group of participants with no intellectual disability.  
There were 102 participants in the comparison group of which 43 were men 
and 59 were women and all had a full scale IQ score between 85 and 141 as 
measured by the WAIS-III.  Participants were between 19 and 70 years of age (mean 
= 37 years; SD 13.1).  Of the 102 participants, 70 (68%) were White, 20 (20%) were 
Black, six (6%) were Asian, one (1%) was Chinese and five (5%) described 
themselves as being of „Other‟ ethnicity.   
99 participants provided information on their educational achievements 
(Table 2).  Most (41%) left school with an undergraduate degree or after GCSEs 
(28%). 
 
Table 2 
       
Educational achievements among participants in the comparison group 
No 
qualifications 
GCSEs /      
O Levels 
A 
Levels 
Certificates Diploma 
UG 
degree 
Other 
Missing 
data 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
2 (2) 28 (27) 10 (10) 4 (4) 8 (8) 42 (41) 5 (5) 3 (3) 
 
53 (52%) participants had attended court of which the majority (83%) had 
attended between one and three times (Table 3).   
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Table 3 
Comparison participants’ attendance at court 
Never 1-3 times 4-6 times 7-9 times 10+ times Missing data 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)     n (%)     n (%) 
46 (45) 44 (43) 4 (4) 1 (1) 4 (4) 1 (1) 
 
Of these 53 people (Table 4), most (47%) had attended as part of the public 
gallery or as a member of the jury (36%) or as a witness (36%). 
 
Table 4 
     
The roles of comparison participants during their attendance at court 
Jury Witness Defendant 
Expert 
witness 
Support 
for 
defendant 
Support 
for 
victim 
Public 
gallery 
Other 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
19 (36) 19 (36) 13(24) 1 (2) 4 (7) 7 (13) 25 (47) 7 (13) 
 
Of the 102 participants, most (n=30; 29%) described themselves as 
„somewhat unfamiliar‟ with court proceedings.  The rest described being „very 
unfamiliar‟ (n=17; 17%), „neither unfamiliar nor familiar‟ (n=27; 27%), „somewhat 
familiar‟ (n=26; 25%) and „very familiar‟ (n=2; 2%).   
62 (61%) participants provided information about their experience of 
psychological difficulties (Table 5).  Of these, the majority had never or only mildly 
experienced problems with anxiety, depression, mania, psychosis or alcohol/drugs. 
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Table 5 
Experience of psychological difficulties among participants in the comparison 
group 
  Never  Mild Moderate Severe Missing data 
  n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Anxiety 17 (27.4) 28 (45.2) 11 (17.8) 6 (9.6) 40 (39.2) 
Depression 18 (29.0) 25 (40.3) 11 (17.7) 8 (12.9) 40 (39.2) 
Elation 26 (42.6) 14 (22.9) 16 (26.2) 5 (8.2) 41 (40.2) 
Psychosis 58 (93.6) 3 (4.8) 1 (1.6) 0 (0) 41 (40.2) 
Alcohol/drugs 53 (85.5) 6 (9.7) 3 (4.8) 0 (0) 41 (40.2) 
 
Measures  
Demographic and information about previous attendance at court 
Basic demographic data (including age, sex, ethnicity, education, 
employment, etc) and self-report of severity of symptoms of anxiety, depression, 
bipolar affective disorder, psychosis, and drug/alcohol addiction was collected 
(Appendix 6).  This questionnaire also included questions requiring self-report of any 
attendance at court proceedings and in what manner (e.g. defendant, witness etc, all 
of which would have similar potential for learning; Appendix 6).  Participants‟ 
criminal records were also established by viewing their criminal record on the police 
national database, with participants‟ consent (see Appendices 3 and 5).   
 
Fitness to Plead task 
Participants were assessed with the FTP task (see Appendices 7 and 8).  This 
task is an ecologically valid 15-minute filmed representation of typical court 
proceedings in which participants were asked to imagine they were subject to court 
proceedings.  Firstly, participants were asked to imagine that they were the defendant 
(a person accused of a crime) and that they were „charged‟ with an offence of 
unlawful wounding.  Key prosecution evidence against them was then described and 
participants were asked to recount what they understood about the charge.  Further 
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elaboration was provided if key details of the charge were not adequately provided.  
Participants then watched the court proceedings vignette.   
The excerpt is based on realistic trial material scripted by legal experts and 
then filmed with actors in a hired courtroom.  It begins with a defence barrister 
discussing the background and details of the case outside of the courtroom.  The film 
then moves into the courtroom and the central prosecution witness (the victim) in the 
case gives evidence in chief and is then cross-examined by the defence barrister.  The 
content incorporates key points of evidence and was sufficiently detailed to minimise 
ceiling or floor performance effects.  The DVD was stopped at various points at 
which participants were asked questions about the excerpt they had just watched 
using a standardised interview.  These questions were devised through extensive 
consultation with legal and clinical experts and examined evidence comprehension 
(factual memory of evidence including errors/disagreement therein and probing of 
the ability to explain why the statements were in error/disagreement) and other 
aspects of the Pritchard test – understanding the charge, comprehension of the 
distinction between a plea of guilty or not guilty, and understanding the roles of court 
personnel and process.  
Individual standardised questions on the FTP task generated scores for 
questions based around the three main Pritchard criteria:  Questions 4 and 5 asked 
about the participants‟ understanding about entering a plea; questions 1-3, 14-30, 36 
and 40 ascertained participants‟ understanding of the evidence / case knowledge; and 
questions 4-8, 11-13, 31-34 and 38 were designed to assess participants‟ 
understanding and knowledge of court proceedings.  Question 8 was used to give an 
indication of participants‟ understanding that a defendant can instruct a lawyer.  In 
line with recent qualitative research (Rogers et al., 2009) indicating that the fifth 
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Pritchard criterion has limited utility in current practice, there was no set question in 
the FTP task to specifically assess participants‟ understanding that a juror can be 
challenged.  However, participants‟ responses on question 12 (What is the role of the 
jury?) was utilised in the analysis as an indication of participants‟ understanding of 
this criterion.  A total score across all items was also calculated for each participant.  
Inter-rater agreement for scores on the FTP measure was 88.8% (112 
agreements/126 items) with a Pearson correlation of r = .894, p = .01. 
 
Measure of intellectual ability 
Intellectual ability was assessed using all twelve subtests of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-3
rd
 edition.  The scores from these subtests were summed to 
provide a score for Full Scale IQ (FSIQ), Verbal IQ (VIQ), Performance IQ (PIQ) 
and scores for the four indices (Verbal Comprehension Index [VCI], Working 
Memory Index [WMI], Perceptual Organisation Index [POI] and Processing Speed 
Index [PSI]).  It is important to mention that although only relevant for a few 
participants, at least six months had passed since participants had been assessed with 
the WAIS-III. 
 
Tests of episodic memory  
Additional measures of auditory memory and recognition memory were 
obtained by assessing participants with Logical Memory I and II and Verbal Paired 
Associates I and II of the Wechsler Memory Scale-3
rd
 edition (Wechsler, 1997).  
There was a delay of about 30 minutes between parts I and II of both subtests.   The 
scores from these subtests were summed to provide an Auditory Immediate scaled 
score (AI), an Auditory Delayed scaled score (AD) and an Auditory Recognition 
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Delayed scaled score (ARD).  As with the WAIS-III, at least six months had passed 
since participants had been assessed with the WMS-III. 
 
A screening measure of psychiatric symptomatology 
The Psychiatric Assessment Schedule for Adults with Developmental 
Disabilities – Checklist (Moss et al., 1998) was completed by a clinician or family 
member who knew the participant with MID well to act as a screen for current 
symptoms of mental or organic illness and acted as an adjunct to participants‟ self-
reported history of psychiatric symptoms.  This measure provides scores for 
„possible organic condition‟ (cut-off of 5), „affective or neurotic disorder‟ (cut-off of 
6) and „psychotic disorder‟ (cut-off of 2).  Scores at or above the cut-off were 
suggestive of the presence of the disorder described.  
 
Procedure 
For both groups, the testing session began with the researcher reading 
through the study information sheet with the participant and answering any 
questions.  Once the participant provided informed consent to take part in the study, 
the testing session began. 
For the MID group each participant was tested individually in a quiet room 
either at the day centre they attended or at their home.  For the comparison group all 
participants were tested individually in quiet clinic rooms at the centre where the 
member of the research team was based.   
All measures were administered in the same order for all participants.  It took 
approximately three hours for participants to complete the tasks.  All participants 
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were paid £25 for taking part in the study and additional £5 if they had to pay to 
travel to take part in the study. 
 
Results 
Examination of the data 
Prior to data analysis, the data was examined for evidence of skewness, 
kurtosis and outliers to ensure normal distribution and the appropriate use of 
parametric statistical analyses of the data.  In order to ascertain whether the variables 
were normally distributed for both groups, the MID and comparison groups were 
examined separately using Levene‟s test for equality of variances.  Examination of 
histograms for both groups for all measures did not demonstrate any obvious 
evidence of abnormal distribution, skewness or kurtosis.  However, in order to be 
sure, two tests of normality – the significance of the skewness and kurtosis – were 
calculated for all the test variables for each group separately.  The z scores were all 
between -2.5 and +2.5 (p = .01) suggesting normal distribution for all the variables 
for both groups.  Therefore independent t-tests were deemed appropriate because 
although the sizes of the MID and comparison group were different (19 vs 102), the 
variances of the two groups were similar.  
 An examination of the standardised scores of all the variables for each group 
separately revealed four scores in the comparison group that were three standard 
deviations below or above the group mean, indicating they were outliers (Field, 
2009).  However, because the analyses described below revealed significant 
differences both with and without the outliers, these outliers were not removed as 
keeping them in was more representative of the whole dataset.   
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Difference in performance of the MID and comparison groups on the FTP task  
Participants in the comparison group performed significantly better than 
participants with MID across all items on the FTP task (total score): t (119) = 6.40, p 
= .001 (comparison group: mean = 52.96, SD = 8.82; MID group: mean = 38.74, SD 
= 9.25).   
Participants were then compared in terms of their performance on the FTP 
task in relation to each of the five Pritchard criteria.  Participants in the comparison 
group showed a significantly greater understanding of what it means to plead „not 
guilty‟ or „guilty‟: t (119) = 4.35, p = .001 (comparison group: mean = 1.98, SD = 
.65; MID group: mean = 1.00, SD = .94).  Comparison group participants understood 
and reported the case evidence more thoroughly: t (119) = 11.29, p = .001 
(comparison group: mean = 28.27, SD = 4.12; MID group: mean = 16.42, SD = 
4.46).  Participants in the comparison group also demonstrated a more advanced 
understanding of court proceedings and the roles of court personnel: t (119) = 9.69, p 
= .001 (comparison group: mean = 15.96, SD = 2.89; MID group: mean = 8.47, SD = 
4.01).  They also showed a greater understanding of the role of the defence barrister: 
t (119) = 3.62, p = .001 (comparison group: mean = 1.33, SD = .53; MID group: 
mean = .84, SD = .60).  Lastly, comparison group participants provided more 
detailed and correct descriptions of the role of the jury: t (119) = 4.62, p = .001 
(comparison group: mean = 1.67, SD = .49; MID group: mean = 1.05, SD = .71).  
These comparisons were all significant at the more stringent Bonferroni corrected 
alpha level (p<.01). 
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Difference in performance of the MID group and comparison group on the 
WAIS-III and WMS-III 
The MID and comparison groups were also compared in terms of their 
performance on the various measures within the WAIS-III and WMS-III.  
Participants in the comparison group had significantly higher scores on all the 
measures within the WAIS-III and WMS-III than the MID group (Table 6).  
Bonferroni correction was used to reduce the risk of type 1 errors and all 
comparisons remained significant at the more stringent alpha level (p=.005). 
 
 
Table 6   
      Mean,  standard deviation and t scores of WAIS-III and WMS-III scores for the 
MID and comparison groups  
 
Group 
  
 
Comparison MID 
  Measures Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t  (df) 
WAIS Verbal IQ (VIQ) 106.11 (12.37) 66.74 (7.06) 19.39* 119 
WAIS Performance IQ (PIQ) 105.93 (13.66) 67.68 (6.86) 18.44* 119 
WAIS Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) 106.70 (12.58) 63.89 (6.75) 21.54* 119 
WAIS Verbal 
Comprehension Index (VCI) 104.59 (11.63) 70.74 (10.25) 11.85* 119 
WAIS Perceptual 
Organisation Index (POI) 105.83 (14.50) 70.89 (6.76) 16.54* 119 
WAIS Working Memory 
Index (WMI) 108.60 (15.83) 64.33 (8.87) 16.94* 118 
WAIS Processing Speed 
Index (PSI) 106.49 (15.45) 71.11 (7.45) 15.43* 119 
WMS Auditory Immediate 
index (AI) 100.30 (16.07) 79.68 (13.64) 5.25* 119 
WMS Auditory Delayed 
index (AD) 102.61 (15.24) 79.89 (14.61) 5.99* 118 
WMS Auditory Recognition 
Delayed index (ARD) 105.56 (14.03) 83.42 (14.73) 6.25* 116 
* p = .001 
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Non-parametric statistical analyses 
Non-parametric statistical analyses using Mann-Whitney U of the differences 
in performance of the groups on the measures described above were also carried out 
as a precautionary measure as they hold less strong assumptions of equal sample 
sizes.  All revealed significant differences at p=.001 therefore supporting the 
reliability of the above findings. 
 
Examination of potential confounding variables  
The groups were also compared in terms of their experience of and perceived 
familiarity with the court system and experience of psychiatric symptomatology 
(Table 7).  As there were no significant differences in performance between the MID 
and comparison groups on these variables they can be removed as potential 
confounding variables for the significant difference in performance between the MID 
and comparison groups on the FTP task, WAIS-III and WMS-III subtests.   
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Table 7 
       Mean, standard deviation and t scores of potential confounding variables for the 
MID and comparison groups 
 
Group 
   
 
Comparison MID 
   Measures Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t (df) p 
Number of times 
been to court .72 (.92) .47 (.84) 1.08 116 .28 
Familiarity with the 
court system 2.67 (1.09) 3.00 (1.05) -1.23 119 .22 
Experience of anxiety 1.10 (.92) 1.06 (.66) 0.16 77 .87 
Experience of 
depression 1.15 (.99) 1.18 (.81) -.12 77 .91 
Experience of feeling 
high/elated 1.00 (1.01) .82 (.95) .64 76 .52 
Experience of 
hearing voices / 
seeing things .08 (.33) .12 (.33) .41 77 .68 
Problem with alcohol 
/ drugs .19 (.51) .12 (.49) .55 77 .58 
*p = .05 ; **p  = .01 
 
Correlations between cognitive variables and performance on the FTP task.  
Tables 8 and 9 provide the Pearson correlations before and after Bonferroni 
correction between the following variables for each group separately: WAIS-III 
FSIQ, VIQ, PIQ, VCI, POI, WMI, PSI; WMS-III AI, AD and ARD; total score on 
the FTP and for each of the five Pritchard criteria.   
For the MID group (Table 8), performance across all items of the FTP test 
(FTP Total) correlated with the WAIS-III PIQ, FSIQ, VCI and POI scores.  In terms 
of the individual Pritchard criteria, understanding court proceedings, instructing a 
lawyer and knowing that a juror can be challenged only correlated with WAIS-III 
VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, VCI and POI.  Understanding and following the evidence of the 
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trial only correlated only with WAIS VCI (p=.01) and WAIS FSIQ (p = .05), and 
understanding entering a plea was not correlated with any of the measures of the 
WAIS-III or WMS-III. 
For the comparison group (Table 9), performance across all items of the FTP 
test (FTP Total) correlated with performance on all of the WAIS-III index scores and 
also the WMS AI and WMS AD, in line with the hypotheses.  FTP total score was 
not correlated with performance on the WMS-III ARD, as expected.   
For the individual Pritchard criteria as measured within the FTP test, 
understanding entering a plea was positively correlated with the WAIS-III VIQ, PIQ, 
FSIQ, VCI and POI. Understanding and following the evidence of the trial correlated 
and understanding court proceedings and personnel correlated with the WAIS VIQ, 
PIQ, FSIQ, VCI and POI.  Scores for understanding and following evidence 
correlated with all measures within the WAIS-III and WMS-III.  Understanding 
court proceedings and personnel correlated with all of the WAIS-III variables, except 
PSI, but did not correlate with any of the WMS-III variables.  Understanding that a 
defendant can instruct their lawyer only correlated with WAIS PIQ and PSI scores.  
Finally, knowing that a juror can be challenged did not correlate with any of the 
cognitive variables within the WAIS-III or WMS-III.   
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Table 8 
      
Pearson correlation coefficients between the cognitive and FTP test variables within the MID group 
  FTP TOTAL 
UNDERSTAND 
ENTERING A 
PLEA 
UNDERSTAND 
THE EVIDENCE 
UNDERSTAND 
COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
INSTRUCT A 
LAWYER 
KNOW THAT A 
JUROR CAN BE 
CHALLENGED 
WAIS VIQ 0.42 0.31 0.37 .60** .63** .46* 
WAIS PIQ .53* 0.14 0.44 .64** .51* .62** 
WAIS FSIQ .55* 0.25 .49* .72**+ .63** .59** 
WAIS VCI .59** 0.09 .59** .64** .63** .52* 
WAIS POI .50* 0.2 0.36 .62** .50* .63** 
WAIS WMI -0.11 0.21 -0.19 0.17 0.24 0.16 
WAIS PSI 0.41 -0.16 .49* 0.33 0.29 0.29 
WMS AI 0.32 -0.06 0.29 0.25 0.05 0.17 
WMS AD 0.37 -0.09 0.38 0.28 0.00 0.08 
WMS ARD 0.37 0.04 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.01 
Note. WAIS VIQ: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3
rd
 edition) Verbal IQ; WAIS PIQ: WAIS Performance IQ; WAIS FSIQ: WAIS Full Scale IQ; 
WAIS VCI: WAIS Verbal comprehension index; WAIS POI: WAIS Perceptual organisation index; WAIS WMI: WAIS Working memory index; 
WAIS PSI: WAIS Processing speed index; WMS AI: Wechsler Memory Scale Auditory (3
rd
 edition) immediate index; WMS AD: WMS Auditory 
delayed index; WMS ARD: WMS Auditory recognition delayed index. 
 
*p< .05; **p < .001; + significant following Bonferroni correction 
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Table 9 
      
Pearson correlation coefficients between the cognitive and FTP test variables within the comparison group 
  FTP TOTAL 
UNDERSTAND 
ENTERING A 
PLEA 
UNDERSTAND 
THE EVIDENCE 
UNDERSTAND 
COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
INSTRUCT A 
LAWYER 
KNOW THAT A 
JUROR CAN BE 
CHALLENGED 
WAIS VIQ .32**+ .21* .34**+ .46**+ 0.16 0.00 
WAIS PIQ .36**+ .27** .36**+ .36**+ .20* 0.04 
WAIS FSIQ .40**+ .26** .40**+ .46**+ 0.19 0.03 
WAIS VCI .40**+ .24* .44*+ .46**+ 0.15 0.08 
WAIS POI .24* .22* .37** .32**+ 0.15 0.05 
WAIS WMI .22* 0.05 .21* .25* 0.07 -0.06 
WAIS PSI .33**+ 0.16 .24* 0.17 .23* -0.02 
WMS AI .23* 0.13 .30**+ 0.19 -0.01 0.06 
WMS AD .23* 0.12 .33**+ 0.19 0.07 -0.02 
WMS ARD 0.19 0.08 .21* 0.06 0.09 -0.02 
Note. WAIS VIQ: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3
rd
 edition) Verbal IQ; WAIS PIQ: WAIS Performance IQ; WAIS FSIQ: WAIS Full Scale IQ; 
WAIS VCI: WAIS Verbal comprehension index; WAIS POI: WAIS Perceptual organisation index; WAIS WMI: WAIS Working memory index; 
WAIS PSI: WAIS Processing speed index; WMS AI: Wechsler Memory Scale Auditory (3
rd
 edition) immediate index; WMS AD: WMS Auditory 
delayed index; WMS ARD: WMS Auditory recognition delayed index. 
 
*p< .05; **p < .001; + significant following Bonferroni correction 
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Discussion 
This study investigated the differences between adults with and without mild 
intellectual disability in their ability to understand and follow court proceedings 
using an ecologically valid measure of fitness to plead and stand trial based on 
realistic court proceedings.  As expected, the adults with mild ID performed more 
poorly across all the Pritchard criteria within the FTP task indicating that people with 
mild ID find it significantly harder to understand various aspects of the trial process 
and proceedings.  This is in keeping with the expectation that a range of cognitive 
abilities are likely to underpin capacity in relation to the Pritchard criteria (BPS, 
2006; p.68 and p.73).  Therefore people with lower scores on a range of cognitive 
tests will perform less well on tests assessing these Pritchard criteria. 
When examining the findings for the comparison group in relation to the 
individual Pritchard criteria, the hypotheses were largely supported. As expected, 
comparison participants‟ ability to describe what it means to enter a plea of guilty or 
not guilty correlated with performance on the WAIS-III VIQ and VCI.  The fact that 
this ability also correlated with WAIS-III PIQ, FSIQ and POI, may simply reflect the 
inter-correlations between the variables within the WAIS-III.  This reasoning may 
also explain the additional correlations found between all the WAIS-III variables 
(except PSI) and the ability to understand court proceedings and personnel.  
Additionally, as predicted, participants‟ ability to understand and follow the evidence 
presented was correlated with all of the measures within the WAIS-III and WMS-III.   
The lack of more correlations between participants‟ understanding of the role 
of a defendant, and in particular that they can instruct a lawyer, with the WAIS-III 
variables may reflect an issue with the scoring for this FTP question.  Participants‟ 
understanding that defendants can instruct their lawyer was inferred from 
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participants‟ responses to just one question: „What is the role of a defendant?‟  
Whilst knowing that a defendant can instruct their lawyer is one of the potential 
answers, there are many other roles of a defendant e.g. giving evidence, listening to 
the evidence presented etc. that participants could give.    Additionally, answers to 
this question were scored with either a: 0, 1 or 2 depending on the content and depth 
of the answers.  Therefore there was likely only limited variation between 
participants‟ scores. 
This reasoning may also go some way to explain why participants‟ 
understanding that a juror can be challenged did not correlate with any of the 
measures within the WAIS-III and WMS-III.  Additionally, the lack of correlations 
may also support the view of many senior criminal barristers that the ability to 
challenge a juror is anachronistic (Rogers et al., 2009): „…it occurs so rarely these 
days that it is effectively redundant…[it would have been] “I stole his ox three years 
ago”…I‟ve only ever had one defendant challenge a juror and that was because she 
was drunk.‟ (p.12) 
Contrary to the comparison group, MID participants‟ understanding of the role of 
defendants and the jury were significantly correlated with all measures within the 
WAIS-III except for WAIS-III WMI.  The lack of a significant correlation between 
WAIS-III WMI and participants‟ understanding of court proceedings is not 
surprising as this type of understanding is based more on semantic knowledge and 
did not require participants to hold in mind and manipulate new information to 
answer the questions assessing understanding of court proceedings and personnel. 
Although the correlations between understanding entering a plea, 
understanding the evidence and understanding court proceedings and the roles of 
court personnel with the variables on the WAIS-III and WMS-III showed a similar 
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trend to those of the comparison group, there were fewer significant correlations in 
the mild ID group.  For example, there were no significant correlations between 
understanding what it means to enter a plea and performance on all the measures 
within the WAIS-III.   
The lack of other significant correlations may represent a problem with 
statistical power.  As the sample size of the mild ID group was smaller than that 
recommended on the basis of the power analysis the power fell to 0.76 thus 
increasing the likelihood of a Type II error.  For example, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient of r = .44 between the score for understanding the evidence presented and 
WAIS-III PIQ scores in the mild ID group was not significant, yet the Pearson 
correlation coefficient of r = .36 between the same variables in the comparison group 
was significant at p = .01 level.  Reduced statistical power may also explain why 
only one correlation remained significant following Bonferroni correction. 
Although there were a number of significant correlations between scores on 
the cognitive tests and the FTP task, the correlations were only modest in size for the 
comparison group (maximum of .46) which only accounts for up to approximately 
23% of the variance respectively.  Therefore between 70% and 80% of the variance 
remains unaccounted for in the FTP scores.  Factors such as effort expended and 
error in measurement during the tasks could potentially account for this remaining 
variance.     
Interestingly, however, whilst there were fewer significant correlations 
among the variables for the MID group, a number of the correlation coefficients were 
large (e.g. .72 for the relationship between WAIS-III FSIQ and understanding court 
proceedings and the role of court personnel).  Therefore, it may be the case that for 
people with ID their scores on standardised measures of cognitive functioning may 
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be more representative of their ability to understand and follow court proceedings 
than among people of average intelligence. 
 
Limitations with research design 
In addition to the limitation with statistical power described above, there were 
a number of other limitations with the study. 
 
Criteria for inclusion of participants into the mild ID group 
Five of the 19 participants in the mild ID group had full scale IQ scores 
between 70 and 75.  Participants with a full scale IQ up to 75 were included in the 
current study because for a diagnosis of ID to be made a person must perform below 
a certain level on tests of intellectual functioning and demonstrate associated 
limitations in adaptive functioning.  All five participants with full scale IQs between 
70 and 75 had known diagnoses of mild ID.    
It is also known that current tests of intellectual functioning do not measure 
IQ to a level of accuracy of one point; there is a margin of error, usually considered 
to be about five points either side of the obtained IQ (Whitaker, 2010).  Additionally, 
the degree of error is thought to increase substantially in the low IQ range such that 
specific IQ scores become unreasonable and unreliable (Whitaker, 2003; 2008).  
Moreover, the accompanying guidance in the ICD-10 (WHO, 2007) suggests that the 
cut-off of a full scale IQ score of 70 for a diagnosis of ID is only an approximation 
and therefore recommends a degree of flexibility in its application.  It was therefore 
deemed appropriate to include participants with a full scale IQ between 50 and 75.  
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The lack of a primary measure of visual memory  
 Although substantial areas of cognitive functioning were addressed through 
the use of the WAIS-III and auditory memory index of the WMS-III, and in 
particular the processing speed index which has a visual working memory 
component, there was no primary measure of visual memory incorporated into the 
battery of tests.  Visual memory is likely to have been important in the fitness to 
plead test due to the multimodal presentation of information – both auditory and 
watching the video.   
 
Limitations with recruitment and testing 
A different member of the research team assessed participants in the 
comparison group and participants in the mild ID group and it is therefore likely  that 
there were idiosyncratic differences in terms of testing style.  However, any 
differences were minimised through group training on the administration of all the 
measures, even though both researchers had quite considerable experience in 
neuropsychological assessment and using the WAIS-III and WMS-III in particular.  
Additionally, inter-rater reliability was very high between the two raters for the 
fitness to plead measure. 
The testing session lasted approximately three hours in total and it was noted 
that a number of participants in both groups described feeling tired at points during 
the testing session, despite being encouraged by the researcher to take breaks.  
Maintaining participants‟ effort and concentration throughout the testing session was 
difficult at times.  There may have been an order effect in that participants‟ scores 
were lower on the tests towards the end of the testing session due to tiredness and 
potentially reduced effort.    
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The testing location also differed for the two groups of participants.  All 
participants in the comparison group were tested at the researcher‟s base.  However, 
due to practical constraints participants in the mild ID group were tested either at 
their local day centre, outpatient clinic or at their homes, which may have introduced 
some variables that could not be controlled for, such as the participant needing to 
answer their home phone, or noise from other rooms. 
 
Limitations of the FTP task 
 An important issue concerns whether participants‟ performance on the fitness 
to plead task would be different or improved if it were related to a personal charge.  
It is known from research investigating suggestibility in individuals with mild ID that 
when assessed about personally-relevant events their suggestibility scores improved 
to approximately the level of people without ID (E.g. White & Willner, 2005; 
Willner, 2008).  However, to anchor fitness to what defendants have „experienced‟ 
(i.e. the charge against them) is also problematic as it will vary on a spectrum from 
direct experience/contextual association with the material events in question to 
presumably no link at all if the defendant is pleading „not guilty‟ or „I was not there‟ 
etc.  It would be impossible to standardise questions about a particular charge and 
establish their ability to follow proceedings on the basis of this measure alone.  
Therefore, ultimately the FTP assessment will always be an adjunct to the wider 
assessment where the defendant would be asked about their charge rather than relied 
on in isolation.  
As this FTP measure is still in development and the underlying factor 
structure has yet to be determined, only tentative conclusions can be made on the 
basis of the findings of this study.  It would be premature to assert that participants in 
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the mild ID group are performing (or failing) in relation to specific elements of the 
task.  In this way, it is not yet possible to establish whether the performance of 
participants with mild ID is globally poorer or whether they are failing on certain 
factors within the FTP task.  However, qualitative observations of participants during 
the current study suggest that participants with mild ID found it more difficult to 
understand and describe the roles of the court personnel and to explain the reasoning 
behind their judgements of how the trial was progressing than to follow the main gist 
of the presented evidence.  Additionally, although participants with mild ID appeared 
to be able to grasp superficial details of the case they did not appear to fully 
understand or hold in mind more complicated information.  
To substantiate the above observations of the performance of participants 
with mild ID the research team are currently in the middle of the „second wave‟ of 
the development of the assessment.  This will include factor analysis of its structure 
using a large sample and using this revised instrument with another sample of people 
with mild ID, in addition to participants with severe depression and participants with 
psychosis.  It will be interesting to see whether the findings of these further 
investigations support those of the current study. 
  
Recommendations 
Given the problem of low statistical power in the mild ID group in the current 
study replication of the study is needed to assess the reliability of the findings within 
this study.  It would also be recommended that a test of visual memory, such as the 
Family Pictures subtest of the WMS-III, be incorporated into the next wave of 
development of the measure, along with the use of the WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008) 
instead of the WAIS-III.  As the WAIS-IV was released recently its norms are likely 
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to be much more representative of the intellectual level of the current population than 
the WAIS-III.  This will therefore increase the reliability of assessments of 
intellectual functioning.  
 
Clinical and legal implications 
The finding that people with mild ID understand and follow significantly less 
information than people without ID in relation to court proceedings indicates the 
need to assist people with ID to understand court processes and to modify the 
processes to meet the needs of person with ID.  Cooke and Davies (2001) 
recommended a number of „special measures‟ such as the removal of wigs and 
gowns by the judge and barrister and the use of an intermediary to assist the 
defendant/witness to understand the court (and vice versa).  Additional modifications 
could include the simplification of language, being afforded more breaks than the 
average defendant to improve attention, and additional time to discuss issues with 
their legal representatives.  A form of screening and improving mental health 
awareness among legal professionals may also help to ensure that fitness to plead is 
not overlooked.  Additionally, by incorporating questions assessing fitness to plead 
within the „Plea and Case Management Hearing form‟ barristers would be required to 
demonstrate that they had considered the issue and asked basic questions of their 
client (Rogers et al., 2009).  Furthermore, an accredited „panel‟ could assist the 
judge, as is the case in a mental health review tribunal.  Such impartial psychiatrists 
could form a legal entity within the Court system. 
However, some of these may be considered disruptive to the trial process and 
may only have limited effect due to less efficient online processing in people with 
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mild ID.  Additionally, the inconsistency of their application (Rogers et al., 2009 
highlights the need for a method to ensure they are not forgotten in Court. 
There are also a number of difficulties with the assessment of fitness in 
current legal practice.  Firstly, legal criteria are applied inconsistently by different 
psychiatrists and on different occasions. Also, as fitness often changes over time, yet 
the assessment of fitness to plead and stand trial relates to the time of the trial only, it 
could be the case that a client could be judged as being unfit to plead when assessed 
in the weeks preceding the trial, but then be better at the time of the trial. 
Additionally, at times there appears to be a lack of a collaborative approach to 
assessments, in that psychiatrists make assessments without consulting legal teams 
(Rogers et al., 2009). 
The central challenge for clinicians, however, is to address the highly 
subjective nature of the decisions about fitness in defendants with ID.  Whether it 
will be possible to determine more objectively at what point the defendant with ID is 
unfit or the extent to which modifications to the trial process will provide adequate 
protection is an issue that requires further investigation.  Further research will enable 
a greater understanding of the precise extent and nature of the poorer performance of 
people with ID and thus aid the development of appropriate measures to support 
people with ID in the criminal justice system. 
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Introduction  
This review will focus on two main areas of concern that arose during the 
development and course of this study and were considered to require a further level 
of consideration and reflection. 
 The first part of this review will focus on issues concerning the nature of 
definitions of intellectual disability (ID) for research and clinical purposes, and 
especially in relation to this study.  The review will then move on to discuss the 
challenge of working with an entirely novel measure that is still in development.   
 
Assessing and defining intellectual disability 
Diagnostic criteria for mild intellectual disability 
According to the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10
th
 Revision Version for 2007 (ICD-10; World Health 
Organisation, 2007) people with an ID have “a condition of arrested or incomplete 
development of the mind, which is especially characterised by impairment of skills 
manifested during the developmental period which contribute to the overall level of 
intelligence i.e. cognitive, language, motor and social abilities” (Mental retardation 
[F70-F79] section 1) existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more 
adaptive areas.    
Alternatively, the white paper Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001) 
defines an ID as: „a significantly reduced ability to understand new or complex 
information and to learn new skills (impaired intelligence); and a reduced ability to 
cope independently (impaired social functioning)‟ (P.14).  These difficulties must be 
present before adulthood and have had lasting effects on development.   
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Both these descriptions emphasise that the presence of a low intelligence 
quotient, for example an IQ below 75, is not, of itself, sufficient for a diagnosis of 
ID; evidence of impaired intelligence and impaired social functioning must be 
present.  They also highlight how there are different ways of defining and classifying 
intellectual disability that are all open to some interpretation.   
In clinical and research practice, any impairment of intelligence in adults is 
identified using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd edition (WAIS-III; 
Wechsler, 1997), or more recently, the revised WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008).  As the 
WAIS-III is the most widely recognised and used assessment of intellectual ability in 
adults, and was used in the current study, this review will focus only on this measure 
of intellectual functioning.  However, there are a number of limitations to using IQ as 
a measure of cognitive functioning and these will now be discussed.  
 
Error in the assessment of intellectual disability 
As discussed above, a necessary but not sufficient part of the diagnosis of ID 
is a FSIQ below 70, or 2 standard deviations (SDs) below the mean (American 
Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
British Psychological Society, 2001; Department of Health, 2001).  This implies that 
a person has a „true intellectual ability‟ (Whitaker, 2010, p.517) that can be measured 
by a single score on an assessment.   
It is acknowledged, however, that current tests of IQ are unable to measure 
intellectual functioning to the level of accuracy that such a description suggests.  
There will always be a degree of error inherent in any measure of IQ, which is 
usually considered to be about five points either side of the obtained IQ (Whitaker, 
2010).  This is why in the current widely used assessment of IQ (WAIS-III) specific 
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scores are given alongside a range between two scores that vary depending on the 
degree of confidence interval chosen (e.g. 90% or 95%).  For example, a 95% 
confidence interval posits that there is a 95% chance that a person‟s IQ score will lie 
within the designated range on the basis of their performance on the measure.  It can 
therefore be argued that the errors inherent in any measurement of IQ mean that it is 
unreasonable to adhere strictly to the current criteria of mild ID.   
 
Chance error 
Firstly, there are two types of chance error in the measurement of IQ 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  The first is „temporal error‟ which relates to various 
situational factors which can influence assessment such as how tired the client is on 
the day, the time of the assessment, the way the assessment is administered, and the 
rapport between the assessor and the person being assessed.  The assessments of the 
standardised sample for the WAIS-III would have taken place under near-optimal 
conditions.  Therefore, it is likely that any assessment in clinical practice, in which it 
is not always possible to control for these situational factors, would contain a greater 
degree of error.   
The second type of error is „scorer error‟ which concerns the degree of 
variation and inconsistency in the scoring of the assessment.  This will vary in part 
according to the degree of training and experience of the assessor. 
 
Inflated error at the low end of the IQ range: the ‘floor effect’ 
A further issue specifically associated with the assessment of people with ID 
is the inflated error at the low end of the IQ range such that specific IQ scores may 
become unreasonable and unreliable (Whitaker, 2003; 2008).  The participants that 
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make up the standardisation sample for the WAIS-III had full scale IQ scores mostly 
within the average range of intellectual ability, and therefore the standardisations of 
their scores may not be as applicable to individuals with low intellectual disability. 
To calculate the participants‟ IQ, raw scores on the subtests are converted 
into scaled scores with a mean of 10, an SD of 3 and a range between 1 and 19.  
When assessing participants with the WAIS-III for this study, the lower their scores 
for individual subtests the less variation there seemed to be between participants 
when these scores were converted to normalised standard scores.  Moreover, it 
became apparent that, for example, one participant could attain a score of 0 for a 
subtest, and another a score of 5, but following conversion they would both be 
allocated the same scaled score.  This therefore credited the former person with a 
greater ability than they have and to the level of the second person.  It therefore 
seemed that standard scores of lower IQ scores, and particularly those between a full 
scale IQ of 50 and 60, were often an overestimation of participants‟ actual ability.   
Interestingly, this issue was investigated by Whitaker and Wood (2008) who 
plotted the distribution of scaled scores on the WAIS-III of people attending a 
psychology service for people with ID.  They found that although only a few people 
attained a scaled score of one, this floor effect appeared to be more relevant for IQs 
in the 40s and 50s.  Therefore, the influence of the „floor effect‟ in increasing IQ 
scores would need to be taken into account when considering the IQ scores of 
approximately a third of participants in the current study. 
 
The ‘Flynn effect’ 
Additionally, there is the role of the „Flynn effect‟ (Flynn, 1984).  This relates 
to the intellectual ability of the population as a whole increasing systematically over 
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the years.  Flynn (1984) found that the greater length of time since an IQ test had 
been standardised the higher the IQ of the population and therefore the more an IQ 
test would overestimate an individual‟s true intellectual ability.  This is potentially 
particularly relevant for the current study as it used the WAIS-III to assess 
intellectual ability which was published in 1997 and therefore its standardisation of 
scores reflects the intellectual ability of people approximately 14 years ago.    
Unfortunately, due to the timing of the current study‟s recruitment and testing period 
it was not possible to use the WAIS-IV instead which, as it was only released in 
2009, may have more accurately reflected the intellectual level of the current 
population and therefore provided a more reliable comparison for the current study 
data. 
 
Assessing adaptive functioning  
Measuring the degree of impairment of social functioning can also be 
difficult.  Clearly some social impairments may be life threatening for the person, for 
example poor skills in eating and drinking, and in keeping warm and safe.  Others, 
such as communication and social abilities, may be important to the individual‟s 
functioning in modern society.  Also relevant are the extent of the difficulties with 
understanding, learning and remembering new things and in generalising any 
learning to new situations.  Assessments of functioning needs to take into account the 
context within which the person is living, including personal and family 
circumstances, age, gender, culture and religion. 
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Implications for the application of the diagnostic criteria for ID 
Within mental health legislation, the criminal justice system and in relation to 
social security benefits, other terms and criteria may be used.  It is important to 
recognise that these exist for specific legal purposes.  This means that someone who 
fits the definition for one piece of legislation may not be covered by another.  In a 
similar way, the criteria for a diagnosis of ID may be applied in different ways by 
researchers and clinicians. 
In research, it is necessary to create and adhere to strict inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for the recruitment of participants in order to produce reliable 
results.  These criteria are based on such factors as age, gender, the type, stage or 
severity of a disease or disorder, previous treatment history, and other medical 
conditions.  Before joining a research study, a participant must qualify for the study. 
Some research studies seek participants with illnesses or conditions to be studied in 
the clinical trial, while others need healthy participants. Criteria are used to identify 
appropriate participants and keep them safe and to help ensure that researchers will 
be able to answer the questions they plan to study. 
Given that there is no definitive and absolute cut-off point for determining 
whether a person has an ID, a degree of flexibility must be applied when interpreting 
their performance on tests of intellectual and adaptive functioning.  As the 
accompanying guidance in the ICD-10 (WHO, 2007) suggests, the cut-off of a FSIQ 
score of 70 for a diagnosis of ID is only an approximation and therefore recommends 
a degree of flexibility in its application: 
„There should be a reduced level of intellectual functioning resulting in 
diminished ability to adapt to the daily demands of the normal social environment.  
Associated mental or physical disorders have a major influence on the clinical 
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picture and the use made of any skills.  The diagnostic category chosen should 
therefore be based on global assessments of ability not on any single area of specific 
impairment skill.  The IQ levels given are provided as a guide and should not be 
applied too rigidly‟ (WHO, 2007, p.1). 
This will mean that different research studies will adhere to different 
diagnostic criteria which can make it more difficult to compare study findings.  
However, providing research studies clearly describe the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria and research participants, replication of the study is more possible and it is 
easier to understand and interpret the results of the study within the context of the 
details of the research sample.     
In clinical practice, a diagnosis of ID can have a major impact on a person‟s 
life.  Although for some it can be a stigmatising and restrictive label, for many others 
it can lead to the provision of support and services, financial assistance, help at 
school and increased understanding and support from the person‟s wider system.  It 
can often be very difficult for people to be referred for an assessment and receive a 
diagnosis as resources are limited and often costly.  Additionally, in protected social 
environments where support is available any impairment in adaptive functioning may 
not be at all obvious in participants with mild ID.  Therefore, services for people with 
ID aim to provide support only to those people with an ID who would benefit from 
the input of local service provision. 
However, given the flexibility in the application of the criteria for a diagnosis 
of ID, different services will adhere to different guidelines.  It can therefore be the 
case that one service may view someone as having an ID according to their criteria, 
but another service that adheres to different criteria may not.  It is a difficult balance 
to strike as services are limited and often costly.  However, adhering too strictly to 
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guidelines can mean that people remain undiagnosed and unsupported by appropriate 
services. 
 
Using entirely novel measures in research 
This piece of research was based on a novel and still in development 
measure.  Prior to this piece of research a systematic review had been carried out into 
the constructs of fitness to plead and stand trial and their application.  Additionally, a 
qualitative investigation using senior criminal barristers was used to determine 
whether the „Pritchard‟ test remained fit for purpose.   
Developing a new psychological measure is a long and complex process.  The 
first step in test development involves defining the test universe, the target audience 
and the purpose of the test.  The next step in test development is to write out a test 
plan, which includes the construct(s) definition, the test format, the administration 
method, and the scoring method.  After a review of the literature, the test developer 
writes a concise definition of the test construct(s) and operationalises each construct 
in terms of observable and measurable behaviours.  The test developer chooses an 
objective or subjective format and the type of test question (for example, multiple-
choice, open-ended etc.)  It then needs to be specified how the test will be 
administered and scored.  The scoring model determines the type of data the test will 
yield (nominal, ordinal or interval).  After completing the test plan, the test questions 
and administration instructions need to be written, after which a pilot test can be 
conducted that provides the necessary data for validation and norming. 
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Reliability and validity of measures 
The test used in this study was described to assess a person‟s fitness to plead 
and stand trial based on their responses to 42 questions.  However, as this measure 
was still in development the scale had yet to be factor analysed to determine how the 
items fitted together and underpinned constructs.  Factor analysis of the scale would 
have required a far larger sample due to the number of items in the test (42).  
Therefore the scale had not yet been assessed based on the items‟ consistency, 
difficulty, discrimination and bias i.e. how each test item performed.   
Validity is the extent to which a test measures what it claims to measure.  It is 
vital for a test to be valid in order for the results to be accurately applied and 
interpreted.  Validity isn‟t determined by a single statistic, but by a body of research 
that demonstrates the relationship between the test and the behaviour it is intended to 
measure. There are three types of validity.  When a test has content validity, the 
items on the test represent the entire range of possible items the test should cover. 
Individual test questions may be drawn from a large pool of items that cover a broad 
range of topics.  In some instances where a test measures a trait that is difficult to 
define, an expert judge may rate each item‟s relevance. Because each judge is basing 
their rating on opinion, two independent judges rate the test separately. Items that are 
rated as strongly relevant by both judges will be included in the final test.   
A test is said to have criterion-related validity when the test has demonstrated 
its effectiveness in predicting criterion or indicators of a construct. There are two 
different types of criterion validity.  Concurrent validity relates to when the criterion 
measures are obtained at the same time as the test scores. This indicates the extent to 
which the test scores accurately estimate an individual‟s current state with regards to 
the criterion. For example, on a test that measures levels of depression, the test would 
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be said to have concurrent validity if it measured the current levels of depression 
experienced by the test taker.  Predictive validity occurs when the criterion measures 
are obtained at a time after the test. Examples of tests with predictive validity are 
career or aptitude tests, which are helpful in determining who is likely to succeed or 
fail in certain subjects or occupations.  A test has construct validity if it demonstrates 
an association between the test scores and the prediction of a theoretical trait. 
Intelligence tests are one example of measurement instruments that should have 
construct validity. 
The validity of the newly-developed test of fitness to plead and stand trial had 
yet to be established at the time of this research.  This therefore precluded the ability 
to confidently assert that the test of fitness to plead and stand trial did in fact assess 
just that.  Similarly, the reliability of the measure was not able to be assessed beyond 
that of its inter-rater reliability, which was found to be high. 
Therefore when conducting the statistical analysis in the current study, 
conclusions could not be confidently made from the findings.  This is particularly 
relevant for the examination of differences in performance on the questions that 
appeared to fit with each of the five Pritchard criteria, where only tentative and 
exploratory analyses could be undertaken. 
 
Scoring criteria 
 Another area of difficulty when using a measure of fitness to plead and stand 
trial that was still in development relates to the scoring criteria for some of the 
questions.  As the researcher progressed through the study described here, it was 
noted that on a couple of questions participants could score only zero or one point 
depending on how well their answers met the described level of detail in the scoring 
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guide.  However, on these questions to obtain a score of one required providing two 
pieces of information.  Therefore even if a participant provided one relevant answer, 
they still did not get given the one point.  Following this study concerns such as these 
were fed back in order to improve the scoring system.  The feedback resulted in these 
questions being reformed into 2 point questions in the revised measure. 
In theory, fitness to plead and stand trial are simple and intuitive concepts.  
However, in practice their determination is complicated.  Attempts at theoretical 
definitions of fitness to plead and stand trial produce long lists of considerations that 
are not fully accounted for.  Separate factors have been described in studies of 
competence that do not support a unitary fit-or-unfit system and, furthermore, it is 
unlikely that discrete aspects of competence correspond to different aspects of the 
trial process (Rogers et al., 2008).  This therefore supports the need for a well-
researched, standardised, criterion-based approach to assessing fitness to plead and 
stand trial, as has been begun through this research. 
Whilst conducting research with an entirely novel measure had a number of 
limitations, it was exciting and rewarding to be involved in the development of a 
measure from its conception.   It demonstrated the complex nature of the process 
involved in developing a measure and the need to be rigorous in ensuring that it is 
reliable, valid, and overall appropriate for use in clinical and research practice. 
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My name is Isabelle Taylor 
 
 
I am doing some research looking at how we 
understand things that happen in a courtroom.   
 
 
I am doing this research with Dr Nigel 
Blackwood at the Institute of Psychiatry.          
I would like you to take part in this research. 
 
 
  
It is important that you understand why this 
research is being done and what you will have 
to do. 
 
 
 
Talk about what you read in this leaflet with 
other people like family, friends or your 
support worker if you like. 
 
  
We will then meet to do the study. It will take 
about 3 hours.  You will be able to take a 
break at any time. 
 
Dr Nigel Blackwood 
MA(Psychology)MD 
MRCPsych 
 
Department of 
Forensic Mental 
Health Science  
 
Box PO23     
De Crespigny Park  
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel +44(0)2078480122 
Fax +44 (0)20 7848 0754 
  
 
FITNESS TO PLEAD STUDY 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
03:00hr
s 
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Why is the study important? 
 
Our study aims to provide information to help 
lawyers and healthcare workers decide if a 
person is able to follow and understand what is 
happening and why in the courtroom. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is up to you if you want to take part.  
 
Even after you start you are free to stop taking 
part at any time and you don‟t have to tell me 
why. 
 
 
What will I have to do? 
 
First, you will need to sign a form to say you 
understand what you have to do and that you 
would like to take part. 
 
 
You will also need to sign a form to allow us 
to ask the police to see personal information 
about your criminal record (if any) that is held 
on the Police National Computer (PNC).   
 
 
 
Unfortunately, if you do not wish for us to see 
this information then you cannot take part in 
the study. 
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The study will then begin.  
 
 
Firstly, we will ask you some general 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
You will then watch a 15min video of a 
criminal trial set in a courtroom. 
 
 
 
You will then be asked to complete some 
questionnaires.  Some are about the video you 
have just watched.  Others will measure things 
like your memory.  
 
 
Who will know what is said at our meeting? 
 
The things you tell me will be kept private 
within our research team.   
 
I will not tell anyone what you say unless I am 
worried that you or someone else might get 
hurt. Then I might have to tell someone. 
 
 
How and where will all my details and answers to the 
questions be kept? 
 
 
Your name and details will not be on any of 
the information you provide – a code will be 
used instead. 
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All information about you will be kept in 
locked cabinets at the Institute of Psychiatry. 
 
 
 
 
Where will the study take place? 
 
Either: 
 
a.) At your home, or 
 
b.) At your local healthcare centre 
 
 
 
What might be good things about taking 
part? 
 
 
- What you tell me may make assessments of people who 
have to go to court better in the future. 
- The study may make the treatment of people in court 
fairer. 
- We will pay you £25 and for any travel on public 
transport needed to take part in the study.  
- If you do not complete the whole study you will still be 
paid for the time you have spent with us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
 
What might not be so good about taking 
part? 
 
 
- The study takes 3 hours. 
- Some questions may be quite hard for you to answer. 
 
BUT! We don‟t expect you to answer all the questions.   
And remember, you can stop taking part at any time. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
 
If there is a problem you can speak to me first 
and I will try to help.  
 
 
If you are still unhappy and want to make a 
formal complaint you can write to: Dr. Nigel 
Blackwood, Department of Forensic Mental 
Health Science, De Crespigny Park, London, 
SE5 8AF. 
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       Part 1: Please tick the appropriate box: 
 
 
 Yes, I would like to take part in this study. 
 
 No, I would not like to take part in this study. 
______________________________________________ 
 
Part 2: Please circle you answers: 
 
1. Have you read the Information Sheet or has someone read 
it to you? 
Yes / No 
 
2. Have you had a chance to think about the study? 
 
Yes / No 
 
3. Do you understand what the study is about? 
 
Yes / No 
 
4. Do you agree to allow us to ask the police to see personal 
information about your criminal record (if any) that is 
held on the Police National Computer? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Dr Nigel Blackwood 
MA(Psychology)MD 
MRCPsych 
 
Department of 
Forensic Mental 
Health Science  
 
Box PO23     
De Crespigny Park  
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel +44(0)2078480122 
Fax +44 (0)20 7848 0754 
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5. Do you understand the good things and not so good things 
about taking part? 
 
Yes / No 
 
6. Do you know that it is okay to stop at any time? 
 
Yes / No 
 
7. Have you been allowed to ask questions? 
 
Yes / No 
 
 
Part 3: If you want to take part you can sign below: 
 
 
Participant‟s Name (print): ___________________________ 
 
Signature: __________________ _____ 
 
Date: ___________ 
 
 
Researcher‟s Name (print): ___________________________ 
 
I have explained the study to the participant and answered all 
questions honestly and fully. 
 
Signature: _________________________   
 
Date: ___________ 
 
Thank you. 
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       FITNESS TO PLEAD STUDY 
(Ethics Approval Number: PNM/08/09-77) 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish. 
 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
You have been asked to take part in a study investigating the cognitive abilities 
which are related to understanding courtroom processes. Our study aims to 
contribute information that may be useful to the decision making of lawyers and 
clinicians in their assessments of an individual‟s „fitness to plead‟ in court 
proceedings. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do, you will be given 
this information to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
We will ask you to complete some questions before watching a 15 minute video set 
in a courtroom. You will then be asked to complete more questionnaires. The 
questionnaires will focus on your understanding of the trial and measure your 
cognitive abilities, such as your memory. We estimate that this will take around 3 
hours. You will be able to take breaks during the testing. 
 
Expenses and payments. 
You will be compensated for your time at payment of £25 and compensated for 
travel expenses on public transportation. 
 
Dr Nigel Blackwood 
MA(Psychology)MD 
MRCPsych 
 
Department of 
Forensic Mental 
Health Science  
 
Box PO23     
De Crespigny Park  
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel +44(0)2078480122 
Fax +44 (0)20 7848 0754 
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What do I have to do? 
After providing informed consent, you will need to answer the questions during the 
interview and complete the questionnaires. You will also complete a letter of 
authorisation allowing the researchers to apply to the police to access any personal 
data held on the Police National Computer (PNC) concerning your criminal record 
(if any). If you do not wish us to access your personal data from the PNC then 
unfortunately you will be unable to participate in this study. 
 
The questions will be related to courtroom processes and are linked to a video which 
you will be presented with during the course of the study. We will also ask you to 
undertake several psychometric assessments, designed to measure various cognitive 
abilities. 
 
You will be fully debriefed at the end of the study as to the full aims and reasons for 
the research. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There are no immediate benefits for you, but in the longer term, the study may 
provide important information for improving assessments of „fitness to plead‟. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study you should ask to speak with the 
researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (Dr. Nigel Blackwood, 
020 7848 0123). 
 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King‟s College London 
using the details below for further advice and information: Dr. Nigel Blackwood, 
Department of Forensic Mental Health Science, De Crespigny Park, London, SE5 
8AF. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes, all information you give us is kept strictly confidential, except in the event of 
imminent risk. It will not be shared with anyone outside of the research team. We 
will handle, process, store and destroy your data in compliance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998. All information which is collected about you during the course 
of the research will be kept strictly confidential and identified by code rather than 
your name. The data will be used only for the research questions raised in the present 
study. 
 
We will collect your data onto paper files. Data analyses will be undertaken within 
our department at the Institute of Psychiatry using password protected network drives 
for storage. Identifiable data will not be held on laptops or PC hard drives. Your 
participation will be audio recorded. All recordings will be transcribed and the 
original audio will be destroyed. 
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You have the right to check the accuracy of data held about you and to correct any 
errors. 
 
All data collected as part of this study will be maintained securely within our 
department for a period of 10 years. 
 
Contact details. 
 
If you would like further information about the study, please contact the study co-
ordinator, Miss Rebecca Brewer, (020 7848 5852). If she cannot answer your 
questions, she will refer you to the most appropriate person on the research team or 
obtain further information and contact you in due course. 
 
Where will the study take place? 
 
The session will take place at the Institute of Psychiatry, King‟s College London, 
South-East London. 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available? 
 
We do not anticipate that new information will become available during the course of 
the study that will be relevant to your participation, but if it does we shall tell you 
about it. 
 
 
What will happen if I don‟t want to carry on with this study? 
 
If you withdraw from the study we will withdraw your data from the study and pay 
you for the time you have spent with us. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of the study will be published in scientific journals and presented at 
scientific conferences. You will not be identified in any report or publication. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The study is organised by Dr. Nigel Blackwood at the Institute of Psychiatry, King‟s 
College London. The study is funded by the Nuffield Research Trust. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee has reviewed 
the ethical aspects of this study. The Nuffield Trust has reviewed the scientific 
aspects of the study. 
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       FITNESS TO PLEAD STUDY 
(Ethics Approval Number: PNM/08/09-77) 
 
Part 1: Please tick the appropriate box: 
 
 Yes, I would like to participate in this study. 
 
 No, I do not want to participate in this study. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
If Yes, please tick each of the following to show your agreement: 
 
 I have read the Information Sheet about the study. 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time without 
giving a reason. 
 
 I have had the opportunity to ask any questions I wish to ask. 
 
 Yes, I agree to complete some neuropsychological tests. 
 
 I have kept a record of the names and contact telephone number of the 
research team in case I have any queries in the future. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant‟s Name (print): _________________________________ 
 
Signature: ______________________________________________ 
 
Date: __________________________________________________ 
 
 
Researcher‟s Name (print): _________________________________ 
 
Signature: ______________________________________________ 
 
Date: __________________________________________________ 
Thank you. 
 
Dr Nigel Blackwood 
MA(Psychology)MD 
MRCPsych 
 
Department of 
Forensic Mental 
Health Science  
 
Box PO23     
De Crespigny Park  
Denmark Hill 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel +44(0)2078480122 
Fax +44 (0)20 7848 0754 
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Demographic and Background Information 
 
Subject I.D: …………………… 
 
 
A) Gender 
    Female 
    Male 
 
B) Date of Birth: …………………… 
 
 
C) What race do you consider yourself?  
 1. White 2. Black 3. Asian 4. Chinese 5.Other (………) 
 
 
D) Occupation: …………………… 
 
 
E) Years in education (from earliest entry): …………………… 
 
 
F) Did you get any qualifications, what were they?  
 
 1. O Levels/GCSE 2. A Levels 3. Certificate 
4. Diploma  5. Degree 6. Other 
 
 
G) Have you ever attended a court? YES / NO 
  
  i) If YES, how many times have you attended court?  
   1-3   
   4-6   
   7-9   
   10+   
 
 
ii) Have you attended court as a: 
   Juror   YES / NO 
   Witness  YES / NO 
   Defendant  YES / NO 
   Barrister   YES / NO 
   Expert Witness YES / NO 
   Defendant Support YES / NO 
   Victim Support YES / NO 
   Public Gallery YES / NO 
   Other   YES / NO  Please list:  
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     H) How familiar are you with courtroom procedures? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very 
Unfamiliar 
Somewhat 
Unfamiliar 
Neither 
familiar nor 
unfamiliar 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
Very 
Familiar 
 
 
 
I) Please could you rate your own experience of the following: 
 
 
 Never 
experienced 
Experienced 
mildly 
Experienced 
moderately 
Experienced 
severely 
Prefer not 
to say 
Feeling anxious 
or panicky 
     
Feeling very low 
in spirits 
     
Feeling very 
high and overly 
elated 
     
Experiences 
which are 
difficult to 
explain, such as 
hearing voices or 
seeing things 
     
Having problems 
due to alcohol or 
other substances 
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FTP TEST  
 
[A] OVERALL TEST INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scoring 
0 or 1 
Scoring Criteria 
 1st 2nd 3rd  
Are you being asked to imagine 
that you are a defendant facing a 
charge? 
   Yes or variant required 
What is your name in this task?    Sam (Taylor) is required 
What have you been charged 
with? 
   Wounding is required 
You will watch a film about your 
attendance at Court. What will I 
then get you to do? 
   Answer questions or variant is required 
 1
st
 Attempt 2
nd
  Attempt 3
rd
 Attempt 
Proceed 
Y/N 
Total 
(Range = 0 to 4) 
    
Questions to check understanding of basic test instructions:  
 If incorrect response given, provide correct answer and repeat 4 questions 
again. 
 Repeat questions 1-4 until satisfactory answers [without prompts] are 
provided.  
 After 3 attempts, if subject has failed to obtain a total score of 4 testing 
should be terminated. 
Instructions to subject: I am going to ask you to imagine that you are a 
DEFENDANT (the person accused of a crime) called Sam Taylor. Imagine 
that you, Sam Taylor, have been charged with an offence of unlawful wounding.  
 
I will ask you to watch a film which shows what happened when you attended 
Crown Court for your trial.  
 
The film will begin with two meetings with your defence barrister outside the 
courtroom. You will then watch a witness, (the person who you are accused of 
wounding) in the case giving evidence in the courtroom.   
 
You need to watch the film carefully as I will ask you questions along the way.  
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[B] TEST „SCENE SETTING‟ 
 
 Photograph presented to subject: David Mullen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenes 1 & 2 played 
 
Instructions to subject: Based on the information given by your defence 
barrister, please tell me as much as you can remember of what happened IN 
THE PUB that night? 
 
When recall is finished prompt subject with “Is that everything?” 
Instructions to subject: This is David Mullen. He is the bouncer at the 
Royal Oak pub. David Mullen has accused you of hitting him during a night 
out. 
 
You are now going to view a meeting with your solicitor and defence barrister. 
Here the charges being brought against you will be explained. 
 
Please listen carefully as I will be asking you about what was discussed. Is that 
clear?   
 
I will now give you some details about the charge against you.  
 
In March you were in a pub with two friends (celebrating your friend’s 
birthday). It is alleged that an argument took place with a bouncer and you hit 
the bouncer. 
 
Is that clear? (Repeat above details as necessary) 
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 The subjects free recall is recorded verbatim and scored 0/6 based on the six 
points listed on the next page: 
 
SECTION 1: First Attempt. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………….………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………... ……………………………………………….     6 
160 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Right, so the key points in that scene: 
1. the bouncer came over and asked you to leave the pub at 1 a.m.  
2. The bouncer had a bottle in his hand.  
3. Your friend, Alex, hit the bouncer.  
4. You grabbed Alex. 
5.  You were hit on the side of your face with a bottle.  
6. You were wearing a yellow top. 
  
Emphasise the points the subject missed. 
 
Okay, as before, please tell me as much as you can remember of what happened 
IN THE PUB that night? 
 
 The subject‟s free recall is recorded verbatim and scored 0/6 based on the six 
points below. 
 
 If subject scores 6: then move on to the next section. 
 
 If score is less than 6: see instructions below. 
 
Prompts for recall:  
* each prompt can be used once after initial recall is complete. 
 How did the incident begin? 
 Were any times mentioned? 
 Was anybody holding anything? 
 What occurred? 
 Did you do anything? 
 Were there any injuries? 
 Was anything about clothing mentioned? 
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SECTION 1: Second Attempt (prompted recall). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………….………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………....6 
 
 
 
Whatever the subjects total score, move on to the next section. 
 
PICTURE IS NOW TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT 
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Instructions to subject: I will now ask you some more questions about your 
case.  
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: 
What do you understand about the charge against you? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………... .......   2  
 
If you were pleading „not guilty‟ what does this mean? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………..........   2   
 
If you were pleading „guilty‟ what does this mean? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………...........  2 
 
What does evidence mean? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………. ............   2 
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[C] UNDERSTANDING ROLES OF COURT PERSONNEL AND THEIR 
OWN ROLE 
 
Scene 3 played 
 Photograph presented to subject: courtroom scene. 
 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Okay, the next part of the film is where you are in 
the dock looking around the courtroom at the start of the trial. You will be 
shown all the people in the courtroom. Please watch carefully.  I will then ask 
you some questions about the roles of the people in the courtroom.  Is this clear? 
 
Clarify points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
 
SECTION 3: 
What is the role of the JUDGE in court? 
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
........…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………….…………………………………………….……………………..............  2  
 
 
What is the role of the DEFENCE BARRISTER? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
….…………………………………………….……………………………………….  2 
 
 
Please rate your agreement with this statement: “A defence barrister should 
always act in their client‟s best interests.” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree / 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Please rate your agreement with this statement: “A defence barrister should 
always follow their client‟s instructions.” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree / 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
What is the role of the PROSECUTING BARRISTER? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………...…………………………………………….…………
…………………………………………………………………............................     2 
 
What is the role of the JURY? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………….…………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………....................................................     2 
 
What would you, as a DEFENDANT, need to do in court? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………...……………………………………………….    2 
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[D] ABILITY TO FOLLOW AND COMPREHEND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Scene 4 & 5 played.  
 
SECTION 4: 
Can you please tell me what the new piece of evidence was? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………...................  1 
 
What does this mean for your case?  
* can you explain why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….……………………..     2  
 
SECTION 5: 
Did DM say he was trying to do something before the incident happened? 
* if yes, ask what. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 1 
 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Your trial will now start. You will see the 
prosecuting barrister talking to the jury at the beginning of your trial. He will 
then begin to question the bouncer, David Mullen.  I want you to watch and 
listen carefully to the proceedings and as before I will ask you some questions 
along the way. Is this ok? 
 
Clarify points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
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Did DM raise an issue about the group of people sitting at the table? 
* if so, what? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… .......................     2 
 
What did DM say that one person in the group did to him? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………….......................
................................................................................................................................     2 
 
Did DM say something about the clothing of this person?  
* if yes, ask what piece of clothing and what colour? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………….. .........      1 
 
Did DM say the person was holding something? 
 * if yes, ask what? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………......    1 
 
 
Had DM mentioned before that the person that attacked him was holding 
something? 
* pp can amend prior answer if necessary. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………….…..     1 
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Instructions to subject: Okay, I am now going to ask you some questions 
about David Mullen’s evidence.   
 
 
 
 
 
Scenes 6, 7, 8 played. 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions to subject: Right, now the trial is going to continue. You will 
firstly see the prosecuting barrister continuing to examine David Mullen. After 
that David Mullen will be questioned (cross-examined) by your defence barrister 
and the barristers will then talk to the Judge without the jury present. Are you 
happy with that?  
 
Clarify points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
 
SECTION 6: 
Did DM say the person hit him? 
 * if yes, ask where? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………..............................................................................    1 
 
Was DM injured? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………….................................................................................     1 
 
Did DM say that he managed to strike the person or not? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………................................................................................      1 
 
When DM said that he left the pub, what did he say happened? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………...............   1 
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SECTION 7: 
What did your defence barrister say that DM had never mentioned before? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….    2 
 
Did your defence barrister say DM was holding something?  
* if yes, what? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………     1 
 
 
Did your defence barrister refer to the clothing of the person who actually 
hit DM? 
* if yes, what did she say? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………...      1 
 
 
What did the defence barrister say you did when the fight took place? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………...............................................................     1 
 
 
 
Did the defence barrister talk about another piece of clothing?  
* if so, which piece and what was the significance of this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….............................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................      2 
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Instructions to subject: It is now nearing the end of your trial. It is currently 
on a break. During this break your defence barrister will discuss with you how 
your trial is going. You will then return to the courtroom and the Judge will 
address your defence barrister. Please watch and listen carefully to the next 
scene. Is this clear? 
 
Clarify any points of misunderstanding before continuing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scene 9 & 10 played. 
SECTION 8: 
What are your next options in your case? 
*can be prompted until „give evidence‟ is suggested. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………..    2 
 
 
Do you have to give evidence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………..…..       1 
 
 
What are the advantages of giving evidence? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….……………………………………     2 
 
 
What are the disadvantages of giving evidence? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………….     2 
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Please rate how well you think your case is progressing:  
Very Badly Badly Neither Bad/Well Well Very Well 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 Why do you think that? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………  2    
 
 
Please rate how fairly you think you are being treated in this case: 
Very Unfairly Unfairly Neither 
Fairly/Unfairly 
Fairly Very Fairly 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Why do you think that? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………     2 
 
 
Please rate how likely it is that you will be found Guilty: 
 
Very Likely Likely Neither 
Likely/Unlikely 
Unlikely Very Unlikely 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  Why do you think that? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………….………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….        2 
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END 
What sentence would you expect to receive if found guilty?  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….    1 
 
 
Why would you expect that sentence? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………      2 
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Scoring guide for Fitness to Plead test 
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Page 3 and 5 
 
SECTION 1 
Scoring 
0 or 1 
Scoring 
Criteria 
 1st 2nd  
Bouncer came over and said we 
had to leave at 1a.m 
  
Bouncer came over and said we had 
to leave is required 
Bouncer had bottle in hand   
Bouncer had bottle is required or 
variant of  bouncer 
Alex hit him   
Alex hit him is required or variant of 
hit 
I grabbed Alex   
Grabbed Alex is required or variant 
of grabbed 
Hit on side of my face with a 
bottle 
  
Hit with a bottle is required or 
variant of hit 
Wearing a yellow top   Yellow top is required 
Total 
(Range 0-6) 
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SECTION 
2 
(Page 6) 
 Scoring If one point answer given: is 
there anything else? 
Concept Question 0 1 2 Criteria 
Comprehension 
of Charge 
3. What do you 
understand about 
the charge against 
you? 
   
 
 
 
2 points: Wounding + breaking 
the skin is required. 
 
1 point: Wounding/assault/hit is 
required. 
Understanding of 
„Guilty‟ 
4. If you were 
pleading „not 
guilty‟ what does 
this mean? 
    
2 points: A response reflecting 2 
or more of the general ideas 
listed. 
 
1 point: A response reflecting 
one of the general ideas listed. 
 
0 points: A trivial or unrelated 
concept. 
Understanding of 
„Not Guilty‟ 
5. If you were 
pleading „guilty‟ 
what does this 
mean? 
   
Understanding of 
evidence 
6.What does 
evidence mean? 
   
Total 
(Range = 0 to 8) 
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Section 2:  
 
Question: If you were pleading „not guilty‟ what does this mean? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. I didn‟t do it 
“I didn‟t commit the crime” 
“I‟m not guilty as charged” 
“Admitting I did it” 
2. I‟m not responsible 
“not taking responsibility for it” 
“denying liability/responsibility” 
“not being culpable” 
3. Prosecution can‟t prove it 
“the case won‟t be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt” 
“prosecution won‟t be able to prove 
the case” 
4. Having a trial “there is going to be a trial” 
 
 
Question: If you were pleading „guilty‟ what does this mean? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. I did it 
“I committed the crime” 
“I‟m guilty as charged” 
“Admitting I did it” 
2. I‟m responsible 
“taking responsibility for it” 
“accepting liability/responsibility” 
“to be culpable” 
3. Lower sentence 
“to get lenient sentence” 
“to have a lighter sentence” 
“thoughts of greater leniency” 
4. Not having a trial “there is not going to be a trial” 
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Question: What does evidence mean? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. Mentions a piece of evidence 
“DNA” 
“blood” 
“hair sample” 
2. Presented in court 
“reliable information used in the 
court” 
“produced in courtroom to prove a 
point” 
“presented by barristers in court” 
3. Makes fact more/less likely 
“used in either defence/prosecution to 
argue guilt/innocence” 
“can link me with the crime or away 
from the crime” 
“things that either prove/disprove 
arguments presented” 
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SECTION 3  Scoring  prompt: is there anything 
else? 
Concept Question 0 1 2 3 4 Criteria 
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
7. What is the role of the 
JUDGE in court? 
     2 points: A response 
reflecting 2 or more of the 
general ideas listed. 
 
1 point: A response reflecting 
one of the general ideas 
listed. 
 
0 points: A trivial or 
unrelated concept. 
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
8. What is the role of the 
DEFENCE BARRISTER? 
     
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
9. A defence barrister 
should always act in the 
client‟s best interests? 
     4 points: Strongly Agree 
3 points: Agree 
2 points: Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
1 points: Disagree 
0 points: Strongly Disagree 
 
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
10. A defence barrister 
should always follow their 
client‟s instructions? 
     
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
11. What is the role of the 
PROSECUTING 
BARRISTER? 
     2 points: A response 
reflecting 2 or more of the 
general ideas listed. 
 
1 point: A response reflecting 
one of the general ideas 
listed. 
 
0 points: A trivial or 
unrelated concept. 
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
12. What is the role of the 
JURY? 
     
Comprehension 
of roles in 
courtroom 
13. What would you, as a 
defendant, need to do in 
court? 
     
Total 
Range 0-18 
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Section 3: 
 
What is the role of the JUDGE? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. To keep order 
“to keep order in court” 
“to oversee proceedings” 
“to interrupt and referee” 
2. Direct the Jury 
“make sure the jury are correctly led” 
 
3. Ensure a fair trial 
“ensure the law is followed” 
“make sure the trial is fair” 
“to act as an objective arbiter” 
4. Pass sentence 
“pass a sentence deemed fitting 
punishment” 
“give sentence where necessary” 
“choose and pass sentence” 
5. Directing acquittals 
“order the jury to acquit me if there is 
not enough evidence and it would be 
unsafe to let them convict me” 
* if mentions that judge has many roles but 
only mentions one prompt for further 
answers. 
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What is the role of the DEFENCE BARRISTER? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. To defend the client 
“to defend you” 
“defends the allegations” 
“to defend the client” 
2. To examine evidence 
“present evidence to show 
innocence” 
“to present evidence in my defence” 
“to show evidence why it was not 
me” 
3. To present case/ Follow the client‟s  
instructions 
“to argue case for the defendant” 
“represent the defendant” 
“present a case favourable to the 
defendant” 
4. Mitigation 
“to show why I did what I did was 
not at all my fault” 
“ to show why my sentence should be 
more lenient” 
5. Challenge prosecution 
“to question prosecution evidence” 
“to challenge the case presented by 
the prosecution” 
6. Advise the client 
“to explain court proceedings to me” 
“to explain what my choices are” 
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What is the role of the PROSECUTING BARRISTER? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. Tries to prove guilt 
“to prove I have committed the 
crime” 
“to argue that the defendant is guilty” 
“shows that your are guilty of 
committing an offence” 
2. Presents the case 
“to present the case against” 
“to build a case against” 
“to create a case against the person” 
3. Examine evidence 
“to put evidence together” 
“to present the evidence” 
4. To be impartial 
“to act fairly” 
“to act as Minster of Justice” 
“to present the case at the highest the 
evidence permits, but no higher” 
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What is the role of the JURY? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. Deliver a verdict 
“to decide whether the defendant is 
guilty or not” 
“to make a decision of guilt” 
“decide beyond reasonable doubt 
guilty or not guilty” 
2. Listen to the case 
“listen to evidence” 
“listen to both sides” 
“to watch all of the court 
proceedings” 
3. Weigh up the evidence from both sides 
“to take all things into account on 
both sides” 
“reach a conclusion based on 
evidence from both sides” 
“to weigh up the evidence” 
4. Be fair minded 
“to be objective” 
“to be independent and fair” 
5. Jury as „lay persons‟ 
“trial by your peers” 
“lay persons” 
“comprised of members of the 
public” 
 
182 
 
 
What would you, as a defendant, need to do in court? 
2 points: A response reflecting 2 or more of the general ideas listed. 
1 point A response reflecting one of the general ideas listed. 
0 points A trivial or unrelated concept. 
General Concept: Examples: 
1. Sit quietly 
“sit quiet and listen” 
“keep calm” 
“be quiet unless spoken to” 
2. Tell the truth 
“honestly tell my side of the story” 
“tell the truth” 
3. To be proactive 
“talk to lawyers about case” 
“ask if I don‟t understand/disagree” 
4. Collaborate with lawyers 
“work with my lawyers to develop 
case” 
“collaborate with the defence team to 
present a fair case” 
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SECTION 4 
Page 9 
 Scoring * prompt: is there anything 
else? 
Concept Question 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Criteria 
Comprehension 
of new evidence 
14. Can you please tell me 
what the new piece of 
evidence was?  
 
   1 point: acknowledge that 
witness has introduced „knife‟ 
Understanding of 
relevance to 
present case 
 
See scoring 
guide for 
examples. 
15. What does this mean 
for your case?  
 
* can you explain why? 
 
   2 points: gives reasoning that 
the new evidence may be both 
favourable AND 
unfavourable. 
 
1 point: gives reasoning that 
the new evidence may be 
either favourable OR 
unfavourable. 
 
0 points: gives no reasoning or 
irrelevant reasons as to why 
the status of the case changes. 
Total 
(Range = 0 to 3) 
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Section 4: 
 
Question: What does this mean for your case? 
2 points: A response which gives reasoning that the new evidence may be both 
favourable AND unfavourable. 
1 point A response gives reasoning that the new evidence may be either 
favourable OR unfavourable. 
0 points A response which gives no reasoning or irrelevant reasons as to why 
the status of the case changes. 
General Concept: Examples: 
2 point examples 
“if the jury believes DM then it will 
make my case worse, but it is also 
better for my case as it shows he is an 
unreliable witness and making things 
up” 
 
“this is new evidence and shows DM 
is unreliable. This is better for my 
case. However, the jury may not 
realise this and believe him, making 
my case worse” 
 
1 point examples 
“it is good for my case because DM 
is lying and now he looks bad” 
 
“it is bad for my case because the 
jury might trust what DM has said” 
 
“there is no evidence of a knife, this 
is new evidence which should have 
been mentioned before so it is good 
for my case” 
0 point examples 
“it makes the case worse” 
“it makes the case better” 
“it makes the charge more serious” 
“I intended to harm DM” 
“more investigation is required” 
“nothing changes” 
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SECTION 5  Scoring 
 
* prompt: is there anything else? 
Concept Question 0 
 
1 2 Criteria 
Clear premises 
 
 
16. Did DM say he was 
trying to do something 
before the incident 
happened? 
 
* if yes, ask what. 
   Indication that DM was trying to 
clear people from the pub for closing 
time. 
Didn‟t want to 
leave 
 
 
17. Did DM raise an issue 
about the group of people 
sitting at the table? 
 
* if so, what? 
   2 points: BOTH Indication that 
group of people were causing a 
disturbance. AND Indication that a 
group of people didn‟t want to leave 
the pub. 
1 point: Indication that group of 
people were causing a disturbance. 
OR Indication that a group of 
people didn‟t want to leave the pub. 
 
Attacked David 
Mullen 
18. What did DM say that 
one person in the group did 
to him? 
 
   2 points: Indication DM was 
attacked with a knife. 
 
1 point: Indication that one of the 
group attacked him. 
Yellow Top 
 
 
19. Did DM say something 
about the clothing of this 
person?  
 
* if yes, ask what piece of 
clothing and what colour? 
   Yellow required. 
Knife 
 
 
20. Did DM say the person 
was holding something? 
  
* if yes, ask what? 
   Knife required. 
Never mentioned 
knife before 
 
 
21. Had DM mentioned 
before that the person that 
attacked him was holding 
something? 
 
* pp can amend prior 
answer if necessary. 
   No or variant required. 
Total 
(Range = 0 to 8) 
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SECTION 7  Scoring 
 
 
Concept Question 0 1 2 Criteria 
Knife never 
mentioned before 
 
26. What did your defence 
barrister say that DM had 
never mentioned before? 
 
   2 points: Knife AND Denim Jacket 
1 point: Knife OR Denim Jacket 
0 points: incorrect answer given 
 
Bottle in David 
Mullen‟s hand 
 
 
27. Did your defence 
barrister say DM was 
holding something?  
 
* if yes, what? 
   Bottle required 
Alex in red top 
 
 
28. Did your defence 
barrister refer to the 
clothing of the person who 
actually hit DM? 
 
* if yes, what did he say? 
   Red required or indication of 
different coloured (not yellow) top. 
Sam intervened 
to protect friend 
29. What did the defence 
barrister say you did when 
the fight took place? 
 
   Indication that ST was protecting 
their friend. 
Denim jacket 
 
30. Did the defence 
barrister talk about another 
piece of clothing?  
 
 
* if so, which piece and 
what was the significance 
of this? 
   2 points: Indication this had not 
been mentioned or involved before. 
Potentially good for their case. 
 
 
1 point: Denim jacket required.  
Total 
(Range = 0 to 7) 
 
SECTION 6  Scoring 
 
 
Concept Question 0 1 Criteria 
Hit David 
Mullen in face 
 
 
22. Did DM say the person 
hit him? 
 
 * if yes, ask where? 
  Indication that DM was hit in the 
face. 
He thought he‟d 
been injured 
23. Was DM injured?   Indication that DM thought he had 
been hurt. 
Struck the person 
that hit him 
24. Did DM say that he 
managed to strike the 
person or not? 
 
  Indication that DM fought back. 
Saw Sam outside 
pub, told police 
25. When DM said that he 
left the pub, what did he 
say happened? 
 
  Indication that DM saw ST outside 
the pub and pointed them out to the 
police. 
Total 
(Range = 0 to 4) 
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SECTION 8  Scoring  
Concept Question 0 1 2 3 4 Criteria 
Appreciation of 
choices 
 
 
31. What are your next 
options in your case? 
 
 
*can be prompted until 
„give evidence‟ is 
suggested. 
 
 
 
     2 points: appreciates the 
choice of giving evidence, 
further consultation with 
lawyer etc. 
 
1 point: vague but correct 
suggestion e.g. to tell the 
truth 
 
0 points: An incorrect or 
unhelpful concept. 
32. Do you have to give 
evidence? 
     1 point: Recognises choice in 
giving evidence. 
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Appreciation of 
advantages / 
disadvantages 
33. What are the 
advantages of giving 
evidence? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     2 points: Recognition that 
they can give their side of the 
story and explain the „no 
statement‟ interview. 
(Mention of no statement 
required) 
 
1 point: indication that they 
can have their story heard but 
no reference to the vignette 
examples of why this may 
help. 
 
0 points: A trivial or 
incorrect idea. 
34. What are the 
disadvantages of giving 
evidence? 
     2 points: Recognition that 
they will be cross examined. 
Evidence could be turned 
against them. Might make the 
case worse. 
 
1 point: suggests one of the 
relevant themes above or 
another correct suggestion. 
No attempt to elaborate or 
suggest why they are 
disadvantages. 
 
0 points: A trivial or 
incorrect idea. 
Understanding of 
case progression 
35. How well do you feel 
your case is progressing? 
 
 
 
 
     4 points: Very Well 
3 points: Well 
2 points: Neither Bad/Well 
1 points: Badly 
0 points: Very Badly 
36. Why do you think that?      2 points: Uses reasoning 
based on the evidence in the 
film e.g. DM mistakes. 
 
1 point: Sensible 
justifications for view not 
based on film but on the 
participants own opinion. 
 
0 points: No sound 
justification for response. 
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Likelihood of 
being treated 
fairly 
 
37. How fairly do you 
think you are being treated 
in this case so far? 
 
 
     4 points: Very Fairly 
3 points: Fairly 
2 points: Neither 
Fairly/Unfairly 
1 points: Unfairly 
0 points: Very Unfairly 
38. Why do you think that? 
 
     2 points: Uses reasoning 
based on the evidence in the 
film e.g. opportunity to give 
evidence. 
 
1 point: Sensible 
justifications for view not 
based on film but on the 
participants own opinion. 
 
0 points: No sound 
justification for response. 
Likelihood of  
being found 
guilty 
39. How likely do you 
think it is that you will be 
found guilty? 
 
 
 
     4 points: Very Unlikely 
3 points: Unlikely 
2 points: Neither 
Likely/Unlikely 
1 points: Likely 
0 points: Very Likely 
40 Why do think that?      2 points: Uses reasoning 
based on the evidence in the 
film e.g. mistakes in 
testimony of DM. 
 
1 point: Sensible 
justifications for view not 
based on film but on the 
participants own opinion. 
 
0 points: No sound 
justification for response. 
Likelihood of 
being punished 
(if convicted) 
41. What sentence would 
you expect to receive if 
found guilty? 
 
 
 
     1 point: a measured, realistic 
sentence suggested [custodial 
sentence, suspended sentence, 
non-custodial sentence, fine] 
 
0 points: An extreme, 
unrealistic or odd sentence 
suggested e.g.  to be freed. 
Why would you expect that 
sentence? 
     2 points: Indication of logical 
thinking and sound reasoning 
in reaching their conclusion. 
 
1 point: A correct guess with 
no justification or indication 
of measured thinking. 
 
0 points: No sound 
justification for response 
Total 
(0 - 28)         ________ 
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Overall scores for each section 
 
  Section   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL 
Score                   
Range 0 - 6 0 - 8 0 - 18 0- 3 0 - 8 0 - 4 0 - 7 0 - 28 0 - 82 
 
 
 
